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iiAbstract
The 'common sense' view of Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific is that it is 
aimed at securing a stable and friendly near neighbourhood for Australia. Contrary to 
this view, this thesis argues that Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific is based 
upon an ideology of institutional neo-liberalism and is therefore mostly concerned with 
transforming governance structures within and around states in line with neo-liberal 
models  of  statehood.  The   Regional  Assistance   Mission  to   the  Solomon   Islands 
(RAMSI) is an Australian-led intervention and state-building initiative designed in 
response to the violence experienced in the Solomon Islands from 1998 to 2001 and the 
following years of state bankruptcy and criminality that plagued the South Pacific state. 
RAMSI   has   been   commonly   represented   as   a   success   story   of   international 
interventionism and state-building, however, I will argue that this representation is 
seriously   flawed   because   of   fundamental   oversights   in   two   key   aspects   of   the 
intervention,   caused   by   RAMSI’s   ideological   underpinnings.   Firstly,   causes   of 
instability and violence in the Solomon Islands are reduced to ethnic conflict, poor 
governance and slow economic growth, while political and historical causes are ignored 
or seen as secondary. Therefore the central 'solutions' to the 'failure' of the state revolve 
around the implementation of 'good governance' and private sector led economic 
growth, whilst long standing grievances are ignored. Secondly, RAMSI is replicating, or 
even exacerbating, many of the same political-economic conditions that led to the 
violent conflict to which it is responding. The implications of this argument are that 
Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific is actually undermining its stated 
objective of promoting stability.
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1Introduction: From an 'Arc of Instability' to a Perfect Storm
Australia’s relations with the South Pacific are usually framed by perceptions of the 
latter as an ‘arc of instability’, consisting of a varying collection of states to the north 
and north-east of Australia that are considered ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states. According 
to current orthodoxy, state fragility is a function of poor governance and unstable 
economic development. Poor governance, in turn is defined by the lack of neo-liberal 
governance institutions. State fragility is seen to threaten the emergence of many 
non-traditional threats to Australia’s security including: transnational crime, money 
laundering, drugs, the illegal arms trade, disease, terrorism and refugees. These 
perceived threats and the prevention of state failure has been the Australian 
government’s rationale for a new regional focus in the South Pacific. The response 
from   successive  Australian   governments   has   been   to   focus   on   strengthening 
governance by building local and regional regulatory institutions, with the aim of 
improving economic growth – an agenda that has been called ‘institutional neo-
liberalism’.
1 Other discourses have also shaped policy priorities, such as historical 
ties, geopolitical exclusion and a sense of Australia’s regional responsibilities in the 
global ‘war on terror’. These converging discourses tend to rely on over-simplified 
and generalised notions of the causes of so-called ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states in the 
South Pacific. However, when considered individually, cases of instability are shown 
to be the result of specific historical and political developments. 
By ignoring the root causes of instability, Australian foreign policy becomes unable 
to achieve its stated objectives. Instead, it is facilitating processes of primitive 
1 Also referred to as 'Socio-Institutional Neo-liberalism' by some authors, see: Toby Carroll & 
Shahar Hameiri. 'Good governance and security: The limits of Australia's New Aid Programme' 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 37, No.4 (2007):410-30, p.413
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accumulation and creating a new Australian hegemony in the region, reversing the trend of 
decolonisation under way since the 1960s. The Australian Government could instead help achieve 
stability, security and poverty reduction in the South Pacific by working with various state and non-
state actors on the specific, localised and historic causes of conflict and instability.
A small scale civil war, commonly referred to as 'the tensions' broke out in the Solomon Islands in 
1998, tens of thousands of people were forced to flee their homes while hundreds were killed. From 
1998-2001 the tensions largely took the form of Militants from Guadalcanal, under the banners of 
the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), attempting to 
expel Malaitan 'migrants' and demand compensation from the government. A rival Malaitan militia, 
the   Malaita   Eagle   Force   (MEF)   formed   to   combat   the   Guale   militants   and   also   demand 
compensation from the government. This period culminated in the MEF backed coup in June 2001 
followed by the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement in October 2001. From the signing of 
the Townsville Peace Agreement to the arrival of The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) in 2003, the political situation was comprised less by organised militants fighting 
each other and more by armed gangs demanding money from anyone they could, particularly the 
government, which was brought to the brink of bankruptcy. 
RAMSI was initially designed as a three step intervention. Firstly, military and police forces were 
sent to restore 'law and order', arrest militants and recover weapons; secondly, efforts were made to 
stabilise government finances; and finally, a long term program of capacity building and governance 
reform was enacted. RAMSI was projected to last ten years or more, it is currently in its ninth year 
with no end in sight. RAMSI presents an informative case study of the directions and limitations of 
Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific region, because it represents the largest commitment 
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of Australian resources to a single project in the region and typifies its institutional neo-liberal 
approach. 
The first chapter of this thesis will review the literature on Australian foreign policy in the South 
Pacific and suggest that the contemporary debate largely takes Australian foreign policy at face 
value and fails to critically analyse the ideological drivers and implications of various policies. I 
look to accounts of institutional neo-liberalism and regulatory regionalism in order to contextualise 
and critique Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific. I will then introduce RAMSI as a case 
study in Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific and review the main criticisms that have been 
made of it. 
The second chapter explores the philosophy and structure of RAMSI and suggests that there are 
serious   inconsistencies   between   RAMSI's   agenda   and   actual   social   and   political-economic 
conditions in the Solomon Islands. RAMSI's almost exclusive focus on law and order, good 
governance and capacity building is shown to be motivated primarily by a securitisation of ‘poor 
governance’, understood in a particular and narrow manner. The notion of ‘good governance’ is 
stripped of its apolitical veneer to reveal an ideology specifically supportive of private capital and 
illiberal governance practices. Capacity building is then shown to be a highly  lopsided reform 
program that supports and empowers institutions that are designed to create and promote neo-liberal 
markets. I will then analyse the structure and functions of RAMSI and argue that the good 
governance reforms advanced by RAMSI are attempting to transform the Solomon Islands state into 
a state approximating an ideal-typical neo-liberal model. 
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Chapter three turns to consider the historical context of conflict in the Solomon Islands, in order to 
answer the question: what impact is RAMSI having on stability in the Solomon Islands? There has 
been a long history of struggles over governance structures in the Solomon Islands and brief 
accounts of some of these will be provided. Both before and after independence, various social 
movements organised around land rights, equitable development, recognition of traditional forms of 
governance, and devolution of political power. The groups of militants that started the conflict in 
1998 advanced demands on the government that are strikingly similar to these earlier social 
movements. In contrast, RAMSI and Australian policy makers have blamed the conflict on 'poor 
governance' and 'ethnic tension'. The argument is then made that RAMSI's neo-liberal framing has 
led to the reinterpretation of conflict in order to pursue a predetermined programme of institutional 
neo-liberalism. 
Finally, chapter four will consider some key issues of the political economy in the Solomon Islands, 
which   highlight   concerns   that   RAMSI,   through   its   neo-liberal   reform   agenda,   is   actually 
perpetuating instability in the Solomon Islands.  An aid bubble has been created in Honiara as 
expatriates working for RAMSI and other agencies fuel an inflationary economy which both 
deepens structural inequality and centralises political power. Logging is the largest industry in the 
Solomon Islands and has been mostly responsible for recent economic growth; however it is 
dangerously unsustainable and without suitable regulation will collapse within the next five years. 
The political economy of land rights and development, issues which were largely responsible for 
the outbreak of tensions and have subsequently been ignored by RAMSI. Significant tension 
between traditional and modern understandings of land rights remains, as does   significant 
discontent   about   continued   inequitable   development.   Such   tension   and   discontent,   left   un-
addressed, could potentially erupt into renewed conflict.  
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The picture that is painted in this thesis comes close to a perfect storm. While RAMSI is currently 
presiding over high economic growth in the Solomon Islands, this growth is almost totally 
unsustainable. Meanwhile, most of the root causes of conflict, particularly disputes over land rights, 
inequitable development, the centralisation of political power, and continued subordination of 
traditional forms of governance have not been resolved. Furthermore, RAMSI is actually facilitating 
a further centralisation of political power, inequitable development practices, and the subordination 
of custom to Western forms of governance. Seen in the historical context outlined in chapter three, 
this is an almost perfect replication of the conditions in 1998 that lead to the outbreak of violent 
conflict. Neo-liberalism as a hegemonic ideology in the state-building context forbids consideration 
of particular grievances and desired outcomes and so plays a severely limiting role in the design of 
Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific. 
The Tongan academic, Epile Haou'ofa, passionately argues that: 
for the purpose of attaining and maintaining cultural autonomy and resisting continuing 
encroachments on and domination of our lives by the global forces aided and abetted by 
comprador institutions […] we must clear the stage and bring in new characters. We must bring 
to centre stage, as main players, our own peoples and institutions.
2
Indeed, neo-liberalism is the latest in a long line of orientalist theories which freeze, homogenise, 
and belittle (post)colonial subjects and thereby legitimise the subordination of populations to 
objective 'rational' theories. Following this, I argue that neo-liberal ideological framings of the 
region must be abandoned in favour of a stance of decolonisation, which would address the 
particular historical causes of conflict and instability rather than replicate them.  This would 
inevitably involve empowering local people to seize control over their own destinies.
2 Epeli Hau'ofa 'Pasts to Remember' in We are the Ocean, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2008, 60-79, pp63-
65
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Introduction
This chapter provides the framework and context necessary for my thesis. I will start 
by briefly reviewing the literature on Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific. 
There is broad agreement that in the post-September 11 world, Australian foreign 
policy is driven mainly by security concerns; in the South Pacific this manifests in 
the discourse about the 'arc of instability'. The common denominator of all aspects of 
Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific is that they are driven by an agenda of 
managing perceived security risks, seen to be associated with poor governance in 
regional states. Critical appraisals of the 'arc of instability' metaphor suggest that it is 
an overly narrow perspective that prevents Australia from engaging with the full 
complexity of   issues faced in the South Pacific. I then introduce a historical 
materialist account of neo-liberalism and the related programme of institutional neo-
liberalism, situating Australian foreign policy within them. Indeed, neo-liberalism is 
argued to be the hegemonic ideology driving Australian foreign policy-making. 
Building on this, regulatory regionalism is defined as a dispositif or technique of 
governance that avoids direct control, yet manages perceived potential risks through 
transforming domestic and regional governance structures. This is a useful way of 
examining the governance structures associated with Australian foreign policy.
I will then introduce RAMSI as a prominent example of Australian foreign policy in 
the   South   Pacific.  RAMSI   is   commonly   represented   as   a  success  story   of 
international intervention and state-building, and most of the criticism that has been 
levelled at RAMSI focuses on particular negative effects of intervention that could 
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presumably be fixed through improved delivery and coordination.  The literature concerning 
RAMSI, unlike the broader discourse on foreign policy in the South Pacific, offers a more diverse 
range of critisism, including some authors who systematically analyse the links between the drivers, 
ideology and effects of RAMSI. 
The 'Arc of Instability' in the Policy-Makers Imagination 
In the majority of the literature, Australian foreign policy is seen to have changed significantly 
following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US and the Bali bombings. It is common for 
analysts to argue that the Howard government largely neglected the foreign policy realm prior to 
2001. The major impacts of the terrorist attacks for Australian foreign policy was to cement 
Australia into the US alliance and the 'war on terror', and focus foreign policy sharply on the issues 
of terrorism and security while elevating the status of foreign policy within the Australian 
government.
1 Hirst describes how Australian strategic thinking has changed in the post September 
11 world: “The terrorist attacks on the US opened up a ‘pandora’s box’ of strategic policy issues in 
Australia”
2 and “prompt[ed] a new array of sweeping accounts, or meta-narratives, describing the 
key features of the contemporary international security environment.”
3  It is also common for 
analysts to view more continuity than change between the governments of Howard, Rudd and 
Gillard, especially in respect to the predominance of security perspectives in foreign policy.
4 
It is worth noting the perceived success of Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific. Cotton and 
Ravenhill, argue that despite the increased status following 2001, foreign policy under Howard had 
1 James Cotton & John Ravenhill. 'Trading on alliance security: Foreign Policy in the post-11 September era' in 
Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005, edited by James Cotton & John Ravenhill, 3-9, 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press,  2007
2 Christian Hirst. 'The Paradigm Shift: 11 September and Australia's Strategic reformation', Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 61, no.2 (2007): 175-192, p.141
3 Christian Hirst. 'The Paradigm Shift: 11 September and Australia's Strategic reformation', p.177-178
4 For example see James Cotton & John Ravenhill. 'Middle Power Dreaming: Australian Foreign Policy during the 
Rudd-Gillard Governments' in Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010, edited by James 
Cotton & John Ravenhill, 1-12, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011
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little to boast about, except that: “arguably, the two major successes have been relations with China 
and with the Pacific Islands.”
5 This view, that relations with the Pacific Islands improved after 2001, 
is almost ubiquitous amongst commentators.
6 To be sure, perceptions of the region have changed in 
Australian policy makers’ imagination and involvement in the region has increased dramatically. 
Interventions by the Australian Defence Force and/or Australian Federal Police have occurred in at 
least five Pacific Island states – The Solomon Islands, PNG, Nauru, Timor Leste and Tonga. 
Australian foreign aid was doubled from 2004 to 2010 while becoming more focused and 
conditional.
7 The Howard government increased its involvement in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
8 
and through this began implementation of the Pacific Plan.
9 It is problematic that most authors see 
this increased involvement as an improvement, without further analysis. 
Much of the literature about Australian foreign policy in the Pacific is concerned with explaining 
the post-2001 shift towards a more interventionist disposition. Here, two narratives are popular in 
the literature: changing global attitudes in the 'age of terror' and 'state failure' in the Pacific. O'Keefe 
has argued: 
5 James Cotton & John Ravenhill, 'Trading on alliance security', p.15
6 See also Geoffrey Barker 'The Howard-Downer Legacy: Global Deputy, Regional Sheriff' in  Middle Power 
Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010, edited by James Cotton & John Ravenhill, 13-31, Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2011
7 The 2006 AusAid white paper outlined four main themes for Australian aid in the Pacific: accelerating economic 
growth; fostering effective states; investing in people; and promoting regional stability and cooperation. This 
represents is a move away from the ‘unconditional’ aid that characterised the cold war period, to a focus on building 
an institutional and regulatory environment where the private sector can grow. AusAID. Australian Aid: Promoting 
Growth and Stability - White Paper on the Australian Government's overseas aid program, Canberra, 2006 
8 The PIF is the primary regional organisation in the South Pacific where Pacific leaders plan regional initiatives, 
however it is compromised by low levels of funding and the sources of its funding. Australia and New Zealand 
provide the largest share of funding to the PIF and are able to determine the agenda and outcomes of most forum 
meetings.
9 The Pacific Plan aims to “enhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and 
security for Pacific countries” through training, mentoring, offering secondments to public officials and embedding 
mostly Australian officials in government departments of Pacific Island states. Shahar Hameiri. 'The region within: 
RAMSI, the Pacific Plan and new modes of Governance in the Southwest Pacific'  Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 63, no.3 (2009): 348-360 p.349
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The 'war on terror' opened up the political space in which increased intervention in the South 
Pacific could be undertaken, but events within the region itself were the central factor 
contributing to intervention.
10
Hirst has similarly argued that:
Recognising the threat posed by weak and failing states following Afghanistan's role in the 9/11 
attacks, the Howard government decided to take a more robust and interventionist approach to 
dealing with state weakness in the South Pacific.
11
Both authors also stress that increased Australian involvement in the South Pacific is not merely a 
case of acting as a 'deputy sheriff' for the USA, rather it is centred on 'Australian interests' and the 
strategic denial of other powers in the region. In short, we have seen an evolution in thinking about 
the South Pacific from a region in danger of 'falling off the map'
12 to one full of security threats and 
risks needing to be managed.
In Australia, the important meta-narrative about the South Pacific is the 'arc of instability' concept. 
'Weak' and 'failed' states from Timor-Leste to Tonga are viewed as threats to stability in the region 
and to Australian security because unstable economic and political conditions and poor governance 
allow, or fail to prevent, non-traditional security threats emerging or expanding in the region. Reilly, 
with his influential 'Africanisation' hypothesis, was one of the first to suggest that the South Pacific 
as a whole, led by events in the Solomon Islands and Fiji, had “changed from an 'oasis of 
democracy' to an 'arc of instability'.”
13 While he never extrapolates instability in the Pacific to 
security threats to Australia, the picture painted of the South Pacific, and the Solomon Islands in 
particular, is of a region plagued by militarism, weak governments and ethnic conflict. 
10 Michael O'Keefe. 'Australia and Fragile states in the Pacific' in Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World 
Affairs 2001-2005, edited by James Cotton & John Ravenhill, 131-149, Melbourne: Oxford University Press,  2007
11 Christian Hirst. 'Foresight or Folly? RAMSI and Australia's post 9/11 South Pacific policies' in Australian Foreign 
Policy in the Age of Terror, edited by Carl John Ungerer, 227-250, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2008
12 Greg Fry. 'Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of 'the South Pacific'' The 
Contemporary Pacific 9, no.2 (1997): 305-344
13 Ben Reilly. 'The Africanisation of the South Pacific' Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no.3 (2000): 
261-268, p.262
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Ayson has provided a critical history of the idea of an 'arc of instability' and its politicisation.
14 He 
argues that during John Howard's term as Prime Minister, the Labor party used the concept to 
influence Australian strategic policy, which they saw as having too much emphasis on Islamic 
terrorism and the Middle-East and not enough on Australia's immediate neighbourhood. It is 
important to note that the ‘arc of instability’ is not a fixed constellation but has taken on various 
configurations of states at different times as the internal politics of Australia’s northern and 
northeast neighbours changes in the imagination of Australian policy-makers.
15 Ayson concludes 
that the two main utilities of the 'arc of instability' concept are strategic and political, rather than 
descriptive or explanatory:
It is one thing for Australian decision makers to know that East Timor, PNG or Solomon Islands 
are each facing serious internal challenges to their individual stabilities. It is another to know 
that Australia is located next to an ‘arc of instability’ which covers all of them. The metaphor 
implies something systemic which goes beyond the individual crises of particular neighbours.
16
The concept continues to hold significant purchase. The 2009 Defence White Paper identifies 
Australia's second most important security objective, behind the ability to defend the Australian 
continent directly, as the “security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood”
17 and 
the continued likely “economic stagnation and political and social instability” caused by “weak 
governance, crime and social challenges”
18 in South Pacific island states. 
More critical appraisals of the 'arc of instability' as a political concept are provided by several 
authors. In Fraenkel's rebuttal of Ben Reilly's 'Africanisation'
19 thesis he points out that: “Some 
Melanesian states face serious underlying tensions, but political crises tend to be localised, episodic 
14 Robert Ayson. ‘The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia’s strategic policy’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 
61, no.2 (2007): 215 - 231
15 Robert Ayson.  ‘The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia’s strategic policy’
16 Robert Ayson.‘The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia’s strategic policy’, p.224
17 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 2009, p.42
18 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, pp35-36
19 Ben Riley. 'The Africanisation of the South Pacific' 
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and obedient to very specific historical causes”.
20 Furthermore, according to Fraenkel, the 'arc of 
instability' framework conceals the specific causes of instability and limits Australia's ability to 
effectively engage in the South Pacific. Reilly, along with most politicians and popular media, has 
been content to fall back on homogenised notions of the South Pacific as an inherently unstable 
region – thereby reducing views of conflict in the Solomon Islands to “an ethnic civil war between 
rival ethnic militias.”
21  Kabutaulaka characterises accounts such as Reilly's as “lazy shorthand 
explanation(s) that divorce the crisis from contemporary socio-economic contexts.”
22 Kabutaulaka 
uses an analysis of political economy to dig beneath the 'ethnic' surface, arguing that a deeper factor 
underlying the 'ethnic' tension, in the Solomon Islands at least, is uneven development patterns. 
Similarly, Liloqula and Pollard argue that the underlying causes of conflict are: the “exploitative use 
of natural resources and inequitable sharing of benefits”; “migration, population pressure and 
uneven development”; “successive failure of government policy and strategies”; and “lack of 
national unity”. These causes are placed within a historical narrative of centralisation of services 
and governance.
23 
McDougall explains well how the securitisation of a region, or even specific situations, can be 
reductionist, which leads to important factors being ignored:
To think of these two conflicts [the Bougainville civil war and the Solomon Islands ‘tensions’] 
primarily in terms of security perspectives could lead to over-simplification. The analytical task 
is to unearth the sources and dynamics of conflict in these islands. […] Focusing on security 
draws attention to the element of threat in situations. However, that focus should not obscure the 
nature of the broader political context. The conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands have 
certainly been threatening in various respects, but these threats have arisen out of certain 
political contexts. In responding to these conflicts, it is necessary to have a broadly political 
20 John Farenkel. 'The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of the “Africanisation of the South Pacific” Thesis', 
Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 42, no.1 (2004): 1-34, p..3
21 Ben Riley. 'The Africanisation of the South Pacific', p.262
22 Tarcisius T.  Kabutaulaka. 'Beyond Ethnicity: the political economy of the Guadacanal crisis in the Solomon Islands' 
State  Society  and  Governance  in  Melanesia  Project  Working  Paper  01/1,   2001,  Available  at: 
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/41949         
23 Ruth Liloqula & Alice A. Pollard. 'Understanding Conflict in the Solomon Islands: a Practical Means to 
Peacemaking' State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 7, Australian National University, 2000
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approach, rather than being unduly influenced by the responses that might normally be 
suggested by securitization.
24 
If Australia's foreign policy in the South Pacific has been driven by an over-simplified security 
framework, the question of alternatives is necessarily raised. The alternative, as McDougall 
suggests, is to unearth the root causes of conflict and instability. To be sure, instability in the South 
Pacific is nothing new, nor are Australian “perceptions of their place in the world that they are 
isolated in a hostile corner, far from friends and close to potential trouble.”
25 What is new is the way 
in which this discourse has simplified causes of instability and linked with global narratives in the 
post-September 11 world.
A second relevant and converging motive for increased Australian involvement in the Pacific, raised 
by some authors, is the strategic denial of other external powers. Firth argues that increased 
involvement in the Pacific from China, Taiwan, the US and the United Arab Emirates, along with 
traditional colonial powers could threaten Australian interests in the region and drive increased 
involvement from Australia.
26 Containment of the Soviet Union during the cold war was motivation 
for a quadrupling of Australian aid to the Pacific,
27 and today China is seen by many to represent the 
biggest threat to the USA’s hegemonic status in the Asia-Pacific and Australian hegemony in the 
South Pacific.
28 Although no author goes so far as to argue that the idea of containing China is a 
primary driver for increased Australian involvement in the Pacific, it reinforces the discourses about 
fragile states that might be vulnerable to ‘chequebook diplomacy’ that does not coincide with 
Australian 'interests'. Australia is seen to be sensitive to other powers operating in the South Pacific 
because of its long history of involvement in the Pacific. Prime Minister Deakin persuaded the 
24 Derek McDougall. 'Conflicts in the Southwest Pacific: The relevance of new security perspectives' Contemporary 
Security Policy 25, no.2 (2004): 339-359, 2004, p.340
25 I.C. Campbell. 'Rock of Ages: Tension Underlying Stability in Tonga' in Australia's Arc of Instability edited by 
Rumley, D., Forbes, V. L. & Griffin, C. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, pp.272-288,  2006, p.273
26 Stewart Firth. 'Australia, the Pacific Islands and Timor-Leste' in Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 
2006-2010, edited by James Cotton & John Ravenhill, 147-164, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2011
27 Greg Fry. 'Regionalism and International Politics of the South Pacific' Pacific Affairs 54, no.3 (1981): 455-84, 
pp.480-481
28 Michael O’Keefe. 'Australia and fragile states in the Pacific'
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British government to colonise the Solomon Islands in 1893,
29 Australia administered Papua New 
Guinea under a League of Nations Mandate from World War I until independence in 1975 and 
important battles were fought across the Pacific in World War II, giving a sense of shared history 
through struggle. Because of this history, as well as geography, the South Pacific is often viewed as 
Australia’s global responsibility. What is important about the literature on strategic denial is how 
well it fits with and supports the more dominant motivations of instability and security. 
Neo-liberalism in Australian foreign policy 
In order to account for the development and direction of Australian foreign policy, it is not enough 
to simply note the inadequacy of the 'arc of instability' metaphor, we must interrogate its 
ideological foundation. In this section, I provide a definition and history of neo-liberalism and 
situate Australian foreign policy within that tradition.
Neo-liberalism is primarily an ideology, one that has become hegemonic since the 1980s in almost 
all fields of politics and economics, indeed in “the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, 
and understand the world.”
30 Harvey provides a baseline definition for neo-liberalism:
Neo-liberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free 
markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices.
31 
As a normative meta-theory, neo-liberalism differs from other forms of capitalism in that it informs 
political-economic frameworks regardless of the instrumental value of such frameworks in 
particular instances. It can thus justify the kind of spending required for RAMSI despite no apparent 
29 Trevor H. B. Sofield. 'Solomon Islands: Unity in Diversity – Then End of a Dream?' in Australia's Arc of Instability, 
edited by Rumley, D., Forbes, V. L. & Griffin, C.Dordrecht, 171-197, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006, p.179
30 David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005, p.3
31 David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p.2
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potential of any kind of return on investment. It is neo-liberalism's normative character that also 
allows it to be applied to a broad range of traditionally non-economic disciplines. 
In the international system, neo-liberalism emerged in the 1980s as the so called Washington 
Consensus, characterised most famously by the 'shock therapy' and structural adjustment programs 
implemented by the IMF that promoted policies of deregulation, trade liberalisation and budgetary 
austerity. Following the end of the Cold War and several crises in global capitalism during the 
1980s and 1990s, a post-Washington Consensus began to emerge that emphasised building 
institutions that regulate economic and financial flows in order to sustain and expand markets, as 
opposed to the Washington Consensus' focus on de-regulation and naked free markets.
32 Peck and 
Tickell trace the evolution of neo-liberalism, while bearing in mind the highly variegated and 
localised versions of neo-liberalism, through its 'roll back' phase to the modern 'roll out' phase or 
'institutional neo-liberalism'. 
No longer concerned narrowly with the mobilization and extension of markets (and market 
logics), neoliberalism is increasingly associated with the political foregrounding of new modes 
of “social” and penal policy making, concerned specifically with the aggressive reregulation, 
disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or dispossessed by the neoliberalization of 
the 1980s.
33
The role of the state in this theory is to mitigate risks to capital and markets, often by shifting risk 
onto communities, the environment and people. Furthermore, because the functions of the state are 
pre-determined, this entails that decision-making becomes increasingly insulated from popular 
influence and democratic institutions, which might stray from the path of neo-liberal reform; 
instead, neo-liberals favour governance by experts and elites.
34
32 Toby Carroll. Delusions of Development: The World Bank and Post-Washington Consensus in Southeast Asia, New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2010
33 Jamie Peck & Adam Tickell. 'Neoliberalising Space' Antipode 34, (2002): 380-404, p. 389
34 David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p.66
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Australian foreign policy in the Pacific and RAMSI in particular can be located within the newer 
practice of institutional neo-liberalism because of the focus and resources dedicated to state-
building, good governance, risk management, institutions and regulation. However, it is perceived 
security concerns and related risk management strategies that drive neo-liberalisation in the South 
Pacific, rather than a narrow concern with extending markets. The logic is that stable states need 
strong institutional and regulatory environments to encourage the private sector growth that 
prevents   security   threats   from   arising   within   their   borders.
35  This   merging   of   neo-liberal 
development and security policy amounts to a 'securitisation' of dynamic political issues. Political 
and ideological disagreements are imagined as threats to security, criminalised and delegitimised.
 
Rosser has provided an account of neo-liberalism in Australian aid policy, which can be tentatively 
applied to Australian foreign policy with respect to the South Pacific, where aid and development 
are the primary mechanisms of foreign policy. For Rosser, there are two factors that have led to the 
prevalence, indeed hegemony, of neo-liberalism over the main contending ideology in aid policy, 
social justice. The first is the power of business interests in a capitalist state. Even though foreign 
policy and aid policy are not high priorities on the reform agenda of the business communities, they 
still mobilise more resources than the NGOs that advocate social justice frameworks. The business 
community is also more disposed to work through the state while development NGOs tend to work 
alongside,   independent   of   the   state  or   in   collaboration   with   international   and   multilateral 
organisations.
36 The second factor is the institutional structure of foreign policy decision making, 
which is concentrated in the executive arm of government and accordingly insulated from public 
scrutiny, debate and influence.
37  One primary mechanism by which AusAID promotes neo-
35 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell. 'Neoliberalising Space' 
36 Andrew   Rosser.   'Neo-liberalism   and   the   politics   of  Australian   aid   policy-making'  Australian   Journal   of 
International Affairs 63, no.3 (2008): 372-385, p.378
37 Andrew Rosser. 'Neo-liberalism and the politics of Australian aid policy-making', p. 379
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liberalisation in its projects is through its risk management strategies. Rosser and Wanner have 
provided an analysis of the ways in which risk management strategies employed by AusAID are 
focused on managing risks to the reputations of AusAID and the Australian government rather than 
the risks faced by poor people in developing countries. Their central argument is that neo-
liberalisation, especially privatisation and marketisation, shift risks from the agencies, governments 
and capital onto poor people, who may find themselves unable to access basic needs in a market 
economy therefore they conclude that: “risk management is strongly related to both the construction 
of liberal market-based societies and the pursuit of the Australian government's foreign policy 
objectives.”
38 While the literature on AusAID here is illuminating, there is a gap in the literature 
concerning the ideology behind Australian foreign policy more generally. One would expect to find 
similar patterns occurring within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for example, yet the 
research remains to be done. A related concept that begins to address this gap is 'regulatory 
regionalism'. 
Regulatory Regionalism in the South Pacific
What is unique about Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific and especially RAMSI is the 
extent to which it emphasises state building and development and is integrated into a broader 
regional interlinked security and development agenda.
39  Several authors have coined the term 
'regulatory regionalism' in order to describe a collection of related phenomena, all of which see 
regional governance becoming embedded within national and sub-national level governance. 
Jayasuriya locates RAMSI within a framework of “new modes of regional governance”
40 as distinct 
from the more traditional multi-lateral organisations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
38 Thomas Wanner & Andrew Wanner. 'Building Neo-liberal Markets and Other Agendas: The Politics of Risk 
Management at AusAID' Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, no.3 (2012): 447-463, p.448
39 Shahar Hameiri.  Regulating statehood: state building and the transformation of the global order,  New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010
40 Kanishka Jayasuriya. 'Regulatory Regionalism in the Asia Pacific: drivers, instruments and actors'  Australian 
Journal of International Relations 63, no.3 (2009): 335-347, p.335
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(APEC). Regulatory regionalism is also distinct from forms of direct governance that might be 
reminiscent of colonialism, which the Australian government has neither the appetite or motivation 
for, preferring 'arm’s length' mechanisms designed to regulate governance according to neo-liberal 
principles. These new modes of regional governance are formed by networks of policy experts, 
largely drawn from the private sector, and prioritise the 'harmonisation of national policy' and 
cooperation of policy makers. The important characteristic of these phenomena is that rather than 
facilitating cooperation between states, states themselves are being transformed and regulated from 
the inside and from the outside, while various prerogatives of state power are being transferred to 
the private sector and new or remodelled national institutions.
41  Jayasuriya observes that the 
“increasing regionalisation of economic and social activity allows political actors to move issues 
and conflicts into a regional level.”
42 In practice, this means that national level decision-making 
becomes more accountable to transnational institutions such as RAMSI and the Pacific Islands 
Forum or to abstracted notions of good governance and neo-liberalism, and less accountable to the 
public or parliament. 
Regulatory regionalism might appear similar to the Foucaultian concept of governmentality – both 
provide an account of how a collection of 'arm's length' mechanisms, or political technologies 
produce particular forms of governance conducive to market societies. Regulatory regionalism, 
however, focuses more on the institutional structure within a region, emphasising the role of 
mechanisms such as 'capacity-building', aid flows, regional cooperation, and harmonisation of 
policy. I find this account most convincing in accounting for how neo-liberal practices are exported 
from Australia to island states in the South Pacific. 
41 Shahr Hameiri. 'The region within', p.349
42 Kanishka Jayasuriya. 'Regulatory regionalism in the Asia-Pacific'
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Solomon Islands in the Arc of Instability
There is almost unanimous agreement in the literature that the Australian government was 
motivated to lead RAMSI because of perceived potential security threats emanating from the 
Solomon Islands. The 'arc of instability' metaphor was applied directly to the Solomon Islands when 
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released the Our Failing Neighbour report, which 
stated that the Solomon Islands risked becoming “a petri dish in which transnational and non-state 
security threats can develop and breed.”
43 These threats were said to include: “drug smuggling, gun-
running, identity fraud and people smuggling, for example. Perhaps even terrorism.”
44  This 
language was almost immediately adopted by then Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister 
Downer, as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was planned and 
implemented in 2003. An interesting point to note is that all the threats cited as originating in the 
Solomon Islands were hypothetical risks. Following the work of Aradau and Van Munster who 
define risk as “a modality of governing and ordering reality, which implies the creation of complex 
technologies as well as political rationalities,”
45 the question becomes “one of taming the infinities 
of risk and incorporating it within a dispositif of governance.”
46 Through this lens, RAMSI can be 
viewed as an exercise in precautionary governance through risk.
Contrary to ASPI's framing of the situation, Kabutaulaka places RAMSI directly within the broader 
changing framework of Australian foreign policy and global security discourse: “Australia's 
willingness to lead the Pacific Islands Forum regional intervention into the Solomon Islands cannot 
be understood by looking at what happened in the Solomon Islands alone.”
47 In the context of the 
43 Elsina Wainwright. Our Failing Neighbour, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2001, p.13
44 Elsina Wainwright. Our Failing Neighbour, p.14
45 Claudia Aradau & Rens Van Munster. 'Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the 
Future' European Journal of International Relations 13, no.1 (2007): 89-115, p.108
46 Claudia Aradau & Rens Van Munster. 'Governing Terrorism Through Risk', p.100
47 Tarcisius T. Kabutaulaka. 'Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI intervention' Contemporary Pacific 17, no.2 
(2005): 283-310, p.302
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literature examined above, it is plausible that RAMSI was designed as a piece of the jigsaw of 
Anglo-American global security rather than an appropriate response to local conflict in the Solomon 
Islands. 
Evaluating and Analysing RAMSI
There is near unanimous agreement in the literature that RAMSI has been successful in its initial 
task of restoring security and disarming militants. Moore demonstrates this view, citing that during 
the first twelve months of the intervention over 3,500 weapons were handed in to authorities and 
conflict, except for some small pockets, had ceased.
48 Beyond this agreement, there are a variety of 
approaches to analysing RAMSI. These can be broadly grouped into two categories, following 
Cox's famous distinction between:
problem-solving theory, which takes the structural characteristic of the present as given in order 
to be able to deal effectively with problems arising within it, and critical theory, which is 
concerned with how those structures emerged and how their existing forms may be liable to 
change.
49
The first category, highlighting aspects of RAMSI which could presumably be fixed through 
improved delivery and coordination include Moore, Fraenkel, Anderson,  Kabutaulaka, Drumgold, 
and Sodhi. 
Moore offers a few initial criticisms of RAMSI: it is overly focused on criminal justice, instead of 
peace and reconciliation; the lack of cultural awareness; the high turnover of RAMSI staff; and lack 
of attention to crumbling infrastructure.
50 In another early study of the conflict, Fraenkel highlights 
problems with the justice system, which was overloaded after RAMSI's initial arrests.
51 Anderson 
has criticised RAMSI for creating an 'aid bubble' in Honiara, whereby a select group of elites and 
expatriates are benefiting from an enlarged public service funded by injections of Australian aid 
48 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis, p.213
49 Robert Cox. 'The 'British School' in the Global Context' New Political Economy 14, no.3 (2009): 315-328, p.316
50 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis, pp.212-216
51 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom
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money, while many Solomon Islanders, including many working for RAMSI, are pushed out of 
Honiara by exorbitant rents into slums on the edge of town.
52 Kabutaulaka cites RAMSI's focus on 
state institutions over non-state actors such as churches, big-men and women's organisations, which 
arguably have more control and influence over resources, as a source of tension.
53 Drumgold claims 
that the focus of RAMSI was overly driven by criminalisation of war and pressure to make 
convictions, which is incompatible with reconciliation and building lasting peace.
54 On the other 
hand, neo-liberal authors and think-tanks have criticised RAMSI for not going far enough with neo-
liberal reform, especially around issues such as land reform, arguing that subsistence agriculture 
should be commercialised.
55
Examples from the second of Cox's categories, critical theory include Allen, Dinnen and Hameiri. 
Allen and Dinnen focus on analysing RAMSI's ideological direction. They identify that RAMSI 
employs a liberal interpretation of developing country violence which privileges ethnic conflict, 
criminalisation and state failure over political causes of conflict. Once framed this way, the solution 
to 'state failure' is the 'liberal peace' consisting of institutions, police, democracy, state building and 
market-led development. They conclude that RAMSI ignores local and indigenous approaches to 
conflict resolution, which might be able to respond to the deeper causes of conflict.
56 Hameiri 
analyses RAMSI as an instance of regulatory regionalism, focusing on the way that state-building 
interventions transform the state. Conceived in this way, RAMSI is a political project that transfers 
52 Tim Anderson. 'RAMSI: Intervention, Aid Trauma and Self Governance', Journal of Australian Political Economy 
62, (2008): 62-93
53 Tarcisius T. Kabutaulaka. ' Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI intervention'
54 Shane Drumgold. Palm Tree Justice, Canberra: Shane Drumgold, 2011, p.291
55 Gaurav Sodhi. 'Five Out of Ten: A Performance Report on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands', 
Issue Analysis 92, The Centre for Independent Studies, 2008
56 Matthew Allen & Sinclair Dinnen 'The North down under: antinomies of conflict and intervention in Solomon 
Islands' Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 3 (2010): 299-327 
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political power from publicly and politically accountable institutions to transnationalised forms of 
governance led by experts and bureaucrats that support market-led development.
57 
Although both types of analysis are valuable and indeed necessary, it is an important  distinction is 
made. While the first set of authors provide specific instances which are problematic, the second set 
makes it possible to situate RAMSI as an ideological project within the broader context of 
Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific.
Conclusion
The literature reviewed in this chapter shows that there is broad agreement about the centrality of 
the 'arc of instability' as a driver of Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific. There is also 
broad consensus that the metaphor simplifies the dynamics of the region, even as authors disagree 
on important dynamics. The disagreement is between those authors that offer suggestions of how 
the intervention might be improved and those that critique the fundamental aspects of intervention, 
especially on an ideological level. Building on the work of several authors, I laid out a framework 
that I will use to analyse RAMSI in the following chapters. Specifically I conceptualise RAMSI as a 
project of institutional neo-liberalism which is attempting to create a model state insulated from 
popular influence through regulatory and regional mechanisms of governance. In the following 
chapter, I show how RAMSI is attempting to implement the transformations of governance in the 
Solomon Islands and justify my classification of RAMSI as a project of institutional neo-
liberalisation and regulatory regionalism. In chapter three, I will examine key parts of the history of 
the Solomon Islands and suggest that the root causes of conflict are much more complex than can 
be admitted by a neo-liberal state-building project that needs insulation from the grievances of poor 
people. As a case study in Australian foreign policy, the implication is that the neo-liberal 
57 Shahar Hameiri. Regulating statehood
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ideological   framework  that  guides   policy-making  actually  could   have  negative   impacts   on 
Australian and regional security, as causes of conflict are ignored and even exacerbated by neo-
liberal projects. 
232. RAMSI and its Limitations as a Neo-Liberal Project
Introduction
This chapter explores RAMSI’s ideological underpinning and its reflection in 
RAMSI’s structure and policies. The central argument presented here is that 
RAMSI's exclusive focus on law and order, good governance, and capacity building 
is   attempting   to   transform   governance   in   the   Solomon   Islands   towards   an 
institutional neo-liberal model of statehood. Beyond the initial task of restoring law 
and order, notions of good governance and capacity building have been central to the 
design and implementation of RAMSI – seen as necessary for ensuring long-term 
social and political stability in Solomon Islands. However, the ideas of good 
governance and capacity building that animate RAMSI’s objectives are more of an 
ideologically   conceived   abstraction,   albeit   a   highly   prescriptive   one,   than   an 
empirically grounded analysis of the actual social, economic and political conditions 
in Solomon Islands. In this sense, RAMSI is reflective of the broader ideology 
behind Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific and its regulatory agenda. 
The first part of this chapter will review several key concepts and apply them 
critically   to   the   intervention.  An   account   of   institutional   neo-liberalism   and 
regulatory regionalism were introduced in chapter one. In this chapter, I use these 
concepts as a lens to examine how good governance and capacity building are 
employed by RAMSI in the Solomon Islands. The notion of ‘good governance’ is 
stripped of its apolitical veneer to reveal an ideology specifically supportive of 
private capital and hierarchical governance practices. The central questions to ask 
about claims of capacity building are: whose capacity is being 'built' to perform 
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which tasks? Capacity building is then shown to be a highly lopsided program that privileges 
interests aligned with private capital and associated with the institutions which are part of the good 
governance institutional framework. The second part will describe the structure and construction of 
RAMSI and how its good governance agenda is being implemented. Largely drawing from the 
policy objectives set out in the 2009 Partnership Framework,
1 I will investigate the three 'pillars' of 
RAMSI: Law and Order; Economic Governance and Growth; and Machinery of Government 
(MoG). The pillars work together to create expectations and regulations for politicians and 
bureaucrats that support neo-liberal economic structures and de-legitimise or criminalise resistances 
to RAMSI's program. Furthermore, the scope for popular influence over public policy is diminished 
as accountability of both politicians and bureaucrats is shifted to transnational actors and private 
capital, undermining the desire for devolution of political power. 
Good Governance and Capacity Building
In chapter one, I reviewed the literature on neo-liberalism, securitisation and regulatory regionalism 
and argued, that Australian foreign policy in the South Pacific and the Solomon Islands in particular 
is motivated by the idea of state failure. This means that the absence or poor functioning of modern, 
western institutions of statehood, particularly those which support liberal market-led development, 
is seen to present multiple potential security threats to the region. The objectives of Australian 
foreign policy in the South Pacific were then argued to be centred upon protecting regional stability 
and Australian security through state-building projects in the institutional neo-liberal mould, 
exemplified by RAMSI. This form of state-building typically does not involve the Australian 
government assuming direct control over Pacific Island states. Rather, these interventions take the 
form of what Jayasuriya and Hameiri have called ‘regulatory regionalism’, a collection of arm's 
1 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee.  Partnership Framework Between Solomon Islands Government and 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, Honiara, 2009
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length mechanisms by which states are regulated and policed through programmes such as RAMSI 
and the Pacific Plan.
2 This section builds on this argument by using two key concepts employed by 
RAMSI: good governance, which broadly outlines RAMSI's objectives; and capacity building, the 
primary mechanism by which this agenda is implemented. This is in order to show that RAMSI is, 
at its core, a project designed to construct a neo-liberal state, and to demonstrate how this project is 
being implemented in the Solomon Islands. 
The concepts of good governance and capacity building are central to all levels of RAMSI's 
intervention, as articulated in an address by RAMSI special coordinator Nicholas Coppel:
RAMSI, and other donors, must continue to focus on building the capacity and capability of 
Solomon Islands in the areas we have always focused: law and order, economic management 
and good governance.
3
RAMSI's particular understanding of good governance however is rooted in institutional neo-
liberalism. While it gives the appearance of an apolitical agenda, it supports transformation of the 
state and governance, indeed the regionalisation of governance, under way in the Solomon Islands. 
To be sure, the term 'good governance' is highly elastic and has been appropriated to refer to diverse 
concepts relating to the management and regulation of states, societies and economies. There is, 
however, a couple of concrete elements to highlight about the term before moving on to establish 
the particular conceptualisation that RAMSI employs. Firstly, the term originates in the discourse of 
donors and implicitly refers to goals that donors wish the recipients of aid to achieve. Secondly, as 
Doornbos points out, it is clearly an evaluative term: “used to invite judgement about how the 
2 See: Kanishka Jayasuriya. 'Regulatory Regionalism in the Asia Pacific: drivers, instruments and actors' Australian 
Journal of International Relations 63, no.3, (2009): 335-347; and Shahar Hameiri. 'The region within: RAMSI, the 
Pacific Plan and new modes of Governance in the Southwest Pacific'. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
vol.63, no. 3, 2009
3 RAMSI public affairs. No Quick Exit for RAMSI: Special Coordinator Reassures Business Community [online], 
http://www.ramsi.org/media/news/no-quick-exit-for-ramsi-special-coordinator-reassures-business-community.html, 
accessed 27/05/2012, 2011 
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country, city or agency was being 'goverened'.”
4  Good governance appeals to an objective 
rationality which understands development as conditional upon institutional structures rather than 
natural endowments, comparative advantages or other contextual factors. Therefore is applied to 
any given situation regardless of how particular contexts have been shaped by histories of 
colonialism or specific, localised factors. 
Discourses around good governance can be located within the framework of institutional neo-
liberalism in so far as they enable a shift in focus onto the governance and creation of institutions 
that regulate markets and societies in ways that are most friendly to private sector-led economic 
development. This model of institutional neo-liberalism is not to be confused with the model 
Weberian state where the bureaucracy is still directed by the (potentially democratic) executive and 
legislative arms of government. Rather, institutional neo-liberalism, manifests a preference for 
insulating   particular   regulatory   institutions,   specifically   those   associated   with   security   and 
economic regulation, from political or popular control. The discourse of good governance helps to 
legitimise this agenda by appealing to an ‘objective’, rational and western standard of governance. 
To Leftwich, it is
clear that the barely submerged structural model and ideal of politics, economics and society on 
which all notions of good governance rests is nothing less than that of western liberal (or social 
democratic) capitalist democracy
5
Through its claim to objectivity, good governance is used to open up space for programmes of 
reform that are regional (or global) and insulated from popular influence through various forms of 
regulatory regionalism.
4 Martin Doornbos. ''Good Governance' The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?' Journal of Development Studies 
37, no.1 (2001): 93-108, p.94
5 Adrian Leftwitch. 'Politics in Command: Development Studies and the Rediscovery of Social Science' New Political 
Economy 10, no. 3 (2009): 573-607, p.581
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Good governance has been primarily associated with politics of development and aid. The World 
Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators are used by donors, including the Bank itself, to assess 
where their development assistance might be most effective; developing states that perform well in 
these indicators are assumed to be more capable of effectively using aid.
6 The shift from using 
measurements of good governance to allocate aid and loans to using it as a model for state-building 
arguably occurred with the emergence of the 'Bush Doctrine' and the invasion of Iraq:
The Bush doctrine’s aim was to recognize, institutionalize and expand the political effects of 
attacks on economic sovereignty that had taken place under the Washington Consensus of the 
1980s and demands for Liberal good governance in the 1990s.
7
Thus, the good governance of 1990s development politics came to be  utilised for state-building 
projects. 
Specifically in the case of RAMSI, the good governance agenda opens up space, within and around 
the state, for forms of regulatory regionalism to monitor and police the activities of, rather than 
directly govern, the Solomon Islands state. The good governance approach focuses on what might 
be called ‘meta-governance’ institutions which regulate the functions of government and the 
economy. This meta-governance is envisioned as a long term or even permanent project, which will 
continue long after RAMSI leaves the Solomon Islands. It is also supported by regional 
organisations,   specifically   the   Pacific   Islands   Forum,   as   a   method   of   regulating   domestic 
governance or policing statehood. Hameiri has contended that:
The hegemony of neoliberal notions of good governance in the formulation of RAMSI's 
objectives has meant that challenges to neoliberalism have been perceived as threatening to both 
political stability and the prospects of economic recovery and hence as security risks to be 
contained.
8 
6 World   Bank.  Worldwide   Governance   Indicators  [online],  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp    ,     
accessed October 3 2012
7 Toby Dodge. 'Coming face to face with bloody reality: Liberal common sense and the ideological failure of the Bush 
doctrine in Iraq', International Politics 46, no.2 (2009): 253-275, p.255
8 Shahar Hameiri. Regulating Statehood: State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.148
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The point about good governance assuming a hegemonic stance is important when it is analysed as 
a technique of 'rational' risk management. RAMSI attempts to ensure that neoliberal notions of good 
governance are ubiquitous and authoritative. Other forms of governance become subservient to 
institutions promoting this form of ‘good governance’, or are eliminated altogether. 
If institutional neo-liberal conceptualisations of good governance underpin RAMSI's policy agenda, 
then 'capacity building' is the mechanism by which the transformations in governance are enacted. 
As Hameiri has argued:
state capacity, rather than being an objective and technical measure of performance that can be 
‘built’, essentially constitutes a political and  ideological mechanism for operationalising 
projects of state transnationalisation.
9 
It should be clear that, at every point, the decision about which institutions to 'build' and who, within 
those institutions, is empowered, is a political decision. Indeed, capacity building is a highly 
lopsided program that singles out the particular institutions and actors for empowerment that 
support the good governance agenda. Specifically, 'capacity building' attempts to transform states 
according to a particular model of what an ideal state looks like. It is not surprising then that 
capacity building has been criticised as an overly hierarchical and potentially unachievable strategy. 
As Leftwich has articulated: 
[capacity building] reflected a strongly top-down approach to development, a very limited 
conception of 'institutions' and the naïve belief that such institutions could be replicated, 
implemented or built anywhere – across space and time, and irrespective of prevailing cultures 
and distributions of power.
10
Regardless of how realistic it is for this strategy to approximate the model of the neo-liberal state, 
the point is that transformations are occurring.   
9 Shahar Hameiri. 'Capacity and its Fallacies: International State Building as State Transformation' Millennium 38, 
no.1 (2009): 55-81, p.57
10 Adrian Leftwitch. 'Politics in Command' pp. 584-585
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RAMSI's capacity building work has consisted of Australian outside 'experts' being seconded 
directly into positions within relevant state institutions as well as serving in advisory roles. While 
this strategy makes it difficult to tell how much of the reform process is directed from Canberra, it 
serves the important role of harmonisation and alignment of interests between RAMSI and actors in 
the Solomon Islands. This process   is an exercise of power aiming at the socialisation and 
internalisation of the discipline required for good governance and associated ideology. Gould, using 
a Foucaultian analysis, describes this kind of meta-governance as 
the exercise of hegemonic authority through internalised disciplines of power [designed to rule] 
not through coercion but through complicity – by instilling a self-discipline in subjects that 
serves the interests of 'government' broadly understood
11
This is largely what capacity building consists of and RAMSI is undoubtedly aiming towards a 
point where the internalisation of discipline and ideology will be sufficient that Australians can 
leave Solomon Islanders to govern themselves.  
While 'capacity building' and 'good governance' appear to be apolitical or even anti-political 
concepts, the institutions and practices that they promote are, of course, still embedded in particular 
attendant power relations. The struggle over political and economic power, particularly over 
resources will continue to remain central to the design and type of economic and political 
institutions.
12 We see evidence of this in the Solomon Islands, where RAMSI's biggest 'successes' 
have been those that support or are supported by the logging industry and the inability to bring 
particular politicians to 'justice', despite the centrality of law and order to RAMSI's mission. 
The Structure and Functions of RAMSI
A “central dilemma” facing RAMSI was that because corruption and criminality had so totally 
penetrated and bankrupted the government, it needed:
11 Jeremy Gould. 'Timings, Scale and Style: Capacity as Governmentality in Tanzania' in, The Aid Effect: Giving and 
Governing in International Development, edited by David Mosse & David Lewis, 61-84, London: Pluto, 2005, p.65
12 Adrian Leftwitch. 'Politics in Command', p.594
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to be more than a mere 'circuit breaker', it was to go beyond disarming the militants. To arrest 
and convict those who had held the nation to ransom, Australia would have to take over critical 
functions in the judiciary and the prison service. […] Crowning this strategy, Australians would 
have to move into the Finance Ministry, into Customs and Excise and into the Payroll 
Division.
13 
RAMSI was envisioned as a long-term intervention into most aspects of governance in the Solomon 
Islands from the outset. Hameiri's research has shown that “RAMSI's indivisibility as a 'package' 
remains unequivocal to Australian and RAMSI officials.”
14   Crucially this 'indivisibility' of the 
RAMSI 'package' meant that actors in the Solomon Islands, who were understandably desperate for 
help in arresting militants and recovering weapons were forced to agree to more long term cessions 
of sovereign powers. This obviously raises questions about the sincerity of Australian and RAMSI 
officials' rhetoric that places consent and partnership at the centre of the intervention and suggests 
that partnership and consent are being used as political technologies for state transformation.  
In April 2009 the Solomon Islands Government and RAMSI signed a new Partnership Framework 
(from now on referred to as the Framework). The Framework was created largely in response to 
demands for more concrete goals and an exit strategy for RAMSI. Instead of an exit strategy with a 
strict time frame, the Framework sets out detailed targets that should be achieved before, or as 
RAMSI draws down its level of assistance.  The overall goal was to achieve:
A peaceful Solomon Islands where key national institutions and functions of law and justice, 
public administration and economic management are effective, affordable and have the capacity 
to be sustained without RAMSI’s further assistance.
15
Reflecting the three steps of intervention outlined above, RAMSI's programme is structured around 
three 'pillars': Law and Justice; Economic Governance and Growth; and Machinery of Government 
(MoG) as well as three issues that cut across  all three pillars: capacity development; gender 
13 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands, Wellington: 
Victoria University Press. 2004, p.172
14 Shahar Hameiri. Regulating Statehood, p.152
15 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, p.6 
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equality; and anti-corruption.
16 There are over 100 individual strategies prescribed. These priorities 
clearly set RAMSI's agenda as one of meta-governance or, to put it another way, one of guidance 
and steering, as opposed to direct development assistance or investment in infrastructure.
Law and Order 
The targets under the Law and Justice pillar are almost exclusively focused on the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force (RSIPF) force, the court system and 'correctional services' all of which are 
placed squarely at the centre of Solomon Islands society. Although it is acknowledged that:
The greatest risk factors for a break-down in law and order are outside the issues of nationhood 
and ethnic rivalry. They are population growth, fiscal capability and stability, food security, 
youth unemployment and unmet expectations,
17
addressing these problems clearly falls outside the conceptualisation of 'Law and Justice' employed 
by RAMSI, which is focused on arresting and incarcerating 'criminals'. Only one out of 55 
strategies outlined for the Law and Justice pillar mentions chiefs and traditional leaders and the 
native/local court system. Even then it is explicitly clear that “the traditional justice systems must 
conform to the Constitution and national law”
18 and no mention is made of any role for churches. 
What this demonstrates is not only a commitment to a (neo-)liberal idea of justice but a 
transformation of the governance of law and order in the Solomon Islands away from pluralistic 
forms of justice, which in practice incorporated localised traditional models operating alongside 
systems of incarceration, towards an exclusive  centralised and modernised western system of 
policing and incarceration.
19
16 Sue Emmott, Manuhuia Barcham & Tarcisius Kabutaulaka. Annual Performance Report 2010, Honiara: Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, 2011
17 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, p.24
18 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, p.45
19 For an analysis of pluralistic form of justice see: Debra Mcdougall & Joy Kere. 'Christianity, Custom and Law: 
Conflict and Peacemaking in the Postconflict Solomon Islands' in Mediating Across Difference: Oceanic and Asian 
Approaches to Conflict Resolution, edited by Morgan Brigg & Roland Barker, 141-162, Honululu: University of 
Hawai'i Press, 2011
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Former public defender in the Solomon Islands Shane Drumgold argues that the primary effect of 
RAMSI has been to turn “an old war-zone into a new crime scene.”
20 Not only has RAMSI and the 
Participating Police Force reinvestigated old cases that had been resolved to everyone's satisfaction 
through traditional reconciliation ceremonies,
21 but its magistrates and prosecutors have refused to 
apply the Amnesty Act 2000 and the Amnesty Act 2001, negotiated as part of the Townsville Peace 
Agreement, thus undermining the previous peace process by which militants agreed to cease 
hostilities.
22 Furthermore, RAMSI controlled courts and prisons implemented several practices that 
contravened Solomon Islands prison regulations and United Nations rulings on the treatment of 
prisoners, including handcuffing and placing accused criminals behind bars while standing trial,
23 
placing prisoners in 24 hour solitary confinement with no reasons given, removing life saving 
mosquito nets and lowering the quantity and quality of food that prisoners receive.
24 
These examples demonstrate that RAMSI is designed as a political show of power that firmly 
places its own version of law and order not only above 'traditional' forms of conflict resolution but 
also above legislation passed by the parliament of the Solomon Islands. The criminalisation of 
former militants serves RAMSI's agenda by casting the problems that continue to plague the 
Solomon Islands in a law and order framework, thus denying the legitimacy of grievances that 
motivated militants. 
Incarceration is also notable for the role it plays in the proletarianisation of a population and in 
complimenting the broader neo-liberal strategy of the marketisation of societies. The move towards 
a framework of 'law and order' over, for example, 'peace and reconciliation' or traditional forms of 
20 Shane Drumgold. Palm Tree Justice, Canberra: Shane Drumgold, 2011, p.20
21 Shane Drumgold. Palm Tree Justice, pp.253-266
22 Shane Drumgold. Palm Tree Justice, pp.283-287
23 Shane Drumgold. Palm Tree Justice, pp.63-74
24 Shane Drumgold. Palm Tree Justice, pp.75-97
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conflict resolution can also be placed in a global context. LeBaron and Roberts locate the dramatic 
expansion of carceral systems globally since the 1970s as a central means by which states govern 
poor people:
The global expansion of carceral institutions and coercive power emerged in part to quell 
resistance to neoliberalism and criminalize alternatives to market dependence [...] in contrast to 
the postwar approach to the governance of social marginality through welfare and social 
assistance, criminalization and incarceration have emerged as a primary means of managing the 
contradictions and insecurities generated by neoliberal social and economic policies.
25
This politics is reflected in the Solomon Islands, where a political choice has been made to 
criminalise and incarcerate people, who may be justifiably viewed as victims of a failed system 
themselves. However, in order to reproduce itself, neoliberal ideology must criminalise those who 
either resist or are excluded from liberal market relations. These processes reveal the philosophy at 
the heart of the governance transformations RAMSI is presiding over in the Solomon Islands – 
coercive governance and intervention can contain inconsistencies associated with unequal market-
relations and market-failure. The law and order pillar is undoubtedly the coercive arm of RAMSI's 
good governance agenda whereby incarceration waits for anyone who strays too far from the 
principles of good governance and the laws it supports. 
Economic Governance and Growth 
The Economic Governance and Growth pillar is focused on building capacity in institutions 
responsible for economic management, while promoting a distinctly neo-liberal economic policy 
agenda, designed to create an environment that is friendly to private sector led economic growth. 
Through the targets in the Framework RAMSI clearly sees its goals as building capacity in areas 
such as budgeting, accounting, auditing and financial regulation. Sectors of the economy not related 
to financial regulation are mentioned only twice.
26 Strategy 2.2 states “Donor infrastructure projects 
25 Genevieve LeBaron & Adrienne Roberts. 'Toward a Feminist Political Economy of Capitalism and Carcerality' 
Signs 36, no.1 (2010): 19-44, pp.25-26
26 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, pp.48-64
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are implemented efficiently and are aligned with SIG priorities”
27 and implies that RAMSI does not 
wish to assume direct responsibility for infrastructure development. Strategy 2.17 is about 
increasing competition within the telecommunications industry.
28  Notable achievements before 
2009 are said to have included the implementation of the  Foreign Investment Act 2005  and a 
reduction in tariffs from 20% to 10%.
29 While the two self-identified highlights of the Economic 
Governance and Growth pillar are both about reducing barriers to international trade and 
investment, and indicate the neo-liberal core, the emphasis on capacity building, training and 
institutions reveal that this is a different kind of neo-liberalism than existed under the Washington 
Consensus, hence my characterisation of RAMSI's programme as institutional neo-liberalisation. 
The hidden assumption in this focus on regulation over economic development is that with the right 
kind of institutions in  place the private sector will assume the role of driving economic 
development.
Machinery of Government 
The MoG pillar is focused on providing technical assistance, training and advice, especially with 
developing legislation to: the Office of Prime Minister and Cabinet; Office of Auditor General; the 
Electoral Commission; the Ministry of Provincial Government and Institutional Strengthening; and 
the National Parliament of the Solomon Islands; amongst others.
30 That is, the ministries and state 
institutions that play a role in regulation, accountability and 'steering' functions of government. The 
overarching goal of the MoG pillar is “A Government Administration that is strategic, professional, 
transparent and accountable in the delivery of services and priority programs of the government of 
the day.”
31 The MoG pillar operates under a similar logic to the Economic Governance and Growth 
27 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, pp.50-51
28 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, p.64
29 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, p.7
30 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, pp.64-87
31 Forum Ministerial Steering Committee. Partnership Framework, p.64
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pillar, however instead of providing economic and financial regulation, the MoG pillar aims to 
institutionalise good governance, which, like economic regulation, is seen to provide a facilitative 
regulatory environment in which the private sector and donors can provide development goods. 
This transformation represents a shift in the role of politicians and bureaucrats, from driving 
development and the economy through encouraging direct investment to steering the private sector 
through regulation. The services and priority programs that the 'government of the day' can deliver 
is actually restricted to this new regulatory role because power over investment decisions is handed 
over to the private sector. 
The transformation in the governance role of politicians and bureaucrats from 'driving' to 'steering' 
has been criticised by commentators as anti-democratic. Hirst argues that this trend in governance 
can:
place a great deal of society beyond the reach of genuine democratic decision and they so 
fragment the public sphere that the possibility of a centre of control, even notionally answerable 
to the democratic will, is seriously diminished. The state is not so much reduced in scale and 
scope, or hallowed out: rather it is fragmented and merged with non-state or non-public 
bodies.
32
This fragmentation of the state, and relegation to playing a regulatory role in the governance of 
society, means that decisions regarding development, the economy and almost all other areas of life 
are further removed from popular influence. Instead, state power and accountability is distributed 
outwards to private capital, transnational actors, donors and to the objectivity of neo-liberal 
ideology. 
Conclusion 
Since 2003, RAMSI has been implementing large scale transformations of the governance 
structures in the Solomon Islands. The intervention was motivated by changes in Australian foreign 
32 Paul Hirst. 'Democracy and Governance' in Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy edited by Jon 
Pierre, 13-35, Oxford: OUP, 2000
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policy discourse that (re)framed failed states as risks to regional stability and ultimately Australian 
security. This process of securitisation and the management of risk have underpinned the entire 
structure, design and objectives of RAMSI. Building capacity for 'good governance' is seen as the 
primary guard against future state failure. However, the conceptualisation of good governance 
employed by RAMSI is in turn underpinned by an ‘institutional’ version of neo-liberal ideology. 
While still emphasising the primary role of markets and the private sector, the state and associated 
regulatory institutions play a much larger role in creating environments conducive to private sector 
led investment, particularly through mitigating risks such as corruption, violence, local resistance 
and financial security. The three pillars of RAMSI all uphold important aspects of this regulatory, 
private-sector-friendly environment. The Law and Justice pillar, with its emphasis on a central 
police force and the disciplinary justice of incarceration provides the social control needed for 
efficient markets. Corrupt politicians, desperate poor people, violent offenders and political 
dissidents are all criminalised and incarcerated because they, or the inconsistencies they represent, 
are seen as threats to liberal market-led economic development. The Economic Governance and 
Growth pillar, while still implementing traditional neo-liberal policies such as removing barriers to 
trade and investment, is largely focused on building a corruption free bureaucracy for the 'efficient' 
management of the economy. The MoG pillar is primarily concerned with strengthening those 
government institutions that are seen as essential for a neo-liberal state and market economy and 
insulating decision making from popular influence. Meanwhile the fundamental issues that led to 
conflict have remained largely unresolved.
Obviously the neo-liberal state model employed by RAMSI is full of the contradictions common to 
every manifestation of capitalism. However, the particularly concerning aspect of the institutional 
neo-liberal model is the assumption that the private sector and international investors will show up 
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to save the day. The next chapter will argue that the conflict was caused by a mix of grievances 
centring on inequitable development, land rights, the subordination of custom to modern western 
forms of government, and the centralisation of political power. RAMSI, however, has ignored these 
causes of conflict in order to legitimise the reform agenda outlined in this chapter, with the 
predictable danger that instability could be perpetuated rather than subdued.  
383. RAMSI's Reinterpretation of Historical Conflict 
Introduction
This chapter serves two purposes. Firstly it provides some of the historical and 
political context necessary to analyse the political situation in the Solomon Islands 
including the RAMSI intervention. I will examine some of the main historical issues 
of contention in order to critically evaluate the governance transformations that have 
been occurring since RAMSI's arrival. The second purpose is to elaborate upon the 
first half of the argument presented in this thesis: that RAMSI, because of its neo-
liberal ideological framework, has reinterpreted the conflict by ignoring the root 
causes in favour of neo-liberal explanations and therefore failed to resolve the 
underlying issues. The context provided here is not intended to be an objective or 
definitive historical account; rather it is included in order to clearly demonstrate the 
narrowness of the assumptions inherent within RAMSI’s programs. Given RAMSI's 
reinterpretation, I argue that the root causes of conflict have been ignored and 
therefore the potential remains for conflict around these issues. In chapter four I 
expand on this argument and show how the short-sighted reforms promoted by 
RAMSI are actually replicating the conditions that led to the conflict in the first 
place.  
Part one of this chapter will provide a brief history of the Solomon Islands, focusing 
on changing governance structures, and will be roughly chronological. A brief 
examination of pre-colonial governance structures and the colonial administration 
will demonstrate that the recent violent conflict has its roots in the power dynamics 
and methods of governance that have been evolving since colonisation. Various 
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social movements provide focal points in the history of the Solomon Islands especially as they 
helped the push towards independence. However, the version of independence granted in 1978 was 
not the de-colonisation as envisioned by pre-independence social movements. I will argue here that, 
a colonial architecture of government and governance remained after independence, which 
perpetuated many of the grievances that eventually sparked conflict in 1998. The Asian Financial 
Crisis and the collapse of the logging industry were key events leading to the crisis in 1998. While 
these events may have provided the economic conditions and proximate triggers, they don't fully 
account for the outbreak of conflict. The statements issued by the militias, clearly demonstrate that 
they were motivated by the same or similar grievances as prior social movements: a deep failure of 
power holders to satisfy many people's desire for land rights, equitable development, the devolution 
of political power, and a greater role for Melanesian kastom
1 in politics. The period following the 
outbreak of tensions will also be briefly described, including looking at the manipulation of kastom, 
the peace process and the arrival of RAMSI.
The second part of this chapter will draw out some of the themes raised by the historical narrative 
outlined in the first part. Uneven and inequitable development, labour migration, the centralisation 
of power, the subordination of  kastom, and land rights are all sources of discontent that have 
motivated social movements from the colonial period until the eventual outbreak of violence in 
1998 and these remain significant issues today. RAMSI's neo-liberal ideology, which runs through 
its  programs in Solomon Islands, is then argued to represent a teleological narrative for state-
building that requires a radical reduction of the causes of conflict in order to support the paradigm 
of 'good governance'. This has left RAMSI incapable of addressing persisting grievances; the root 
1 Kastom, pijin for custom, is perhaps the most complicated topic in the mix of Solomon Island politics. Supposedly 
based on an 'authentic' past, kastom actually varies significantly between cultures within the Solomon Islands. 
Kastom might be better thought of as a collection of 'laws' and ways of life that may or may not have roots in pre-
colonial traditions, however they are often grouped together in-order to achieve political legitimacy. Regardless of 
the 'authenticity' of the policies, the notable aspect is the frequency and popularity of these demands. 
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causes of conflict remain simmering beneath the surface. The conclusion of this chapter then leads 
to the argument presented in chapter four, which outlines how the governance transformations that 
RAMSI is enacting in the Solomon Islands are replicating the situation that led to conflict in 1998, 
thus providing no real security for either the Solomon Islands, the South Pacific or Australia. 
From pre-colonial governance to WWII
There is neither the space nor scope to discuss pre-colonial governance in the Solomon Islands in 
detail, however, a few broad points should be mentioned here because of their relevance to 
contemporary politics. There were over eighty distinct languages and many dialects of each existing 
in the Solomon Islands prior to colonisation; culture, political organisation and production were 
similarly diverse. While most of the population survived on subsistence agriculture, there was an 
intricate network of trade between groups. Historians and anthropologists theorise that each village 
of up to 200 people was ruled loosely by up to five 'big-men'.
2   Cultural ceremonies existed to 
maintain and restore peace between conflicting groups and facilitate trade in important and 
specialised resources.
3 
Solomon Islands was declared a British protectorate in 1893. Motivations for colonisation included 
the demand for labour, with Solomon Islanders making up the bulk of indentured labourers on the 
plantations in Fiji and Queensland, and security concerns over other European powers establishing 
themselves close to the vulnerable Australian colonies.
4 To secure funding for the administration, 
massive processes of land alienation and pacification were driven by the government in order to 
establish plantations and attract foreign investment, especially on the islands of New Georgia and 
2 See: Judith A. Bennett.  Wealth of the Solomons: A history of A Pacific archipelago; 1800 – 1978,  Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1987, pp.6-16
3 Debra McDougall & Joy Kere. 'Christianity, Custom and Law: Conflict and Peacemaking in Postconflict Solomon 
Islands' in Mediating Across Difference: Oceanic and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution, edited by Morgan 
Brigg & Roland Barker, 141-162, Honululu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011
4 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, pp.103-106
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Guadalcanal.
5 These processes, though haphazard and piecemeal, represented epistemic violence 
(and was enforced with physical violence) against indigenous governance structures, customs and 
religions which were imperfectly replaced by European notions of government and religion.
Since virtually all the old means of acquiring and, more important, maintaining power were 
closed, many of the elders attempted to prop up the ruins of their authority by obtaining and 
redistributing wealth from other sources.
6
Through the violent processes of pacification and land alienation, the British coerced former elites 
to loosely integrate into capitalist production and trade, replacing traditional trade and gift 
networks. 
While land alienation and pacification came relatively swiftly to parts of the Solomon Islands, the 
main contact Malaitans had with Europeans was through the labour trade. With a dense population 
and rugged terrain, the island of Malaita was more appealing as a source of labour for plantations in 
Queensland, Fiji and other Solomon Islands than as a site for new plantations. From 1870-1911 
Malaitans made up 58% of Solomon Islanders working as indentured labourers abroad; after the 
international labour trade dried up, Malaitans became the main source of labour working in 
domestic plantations; between 1913-40 they made up 68% of the domestic labour trade.
7 However, 
[Britain] did little to develop Malaita itself. Since independence, governments have not 
questioned the British blueprint: Malaita, still underdeveloped, remains a huge labour reserve 
for industries on other islands
.8 
This inequitable situation facilitated the beginnings of social movements in the Solomon Islands. 
The 'Gizo Revolt' in 1934 saw 38 people arrested for refusing to pay taxes. Their refusal was a 
protest against taxes remaining at ₤1 while copra prices plummeted and the lack of government 
spending or attention given in return for the tax.
9  The 'Rule and Chair' movement, under the 
5 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, pp.106-115
6 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, p.115
7 Clive Moore. 'The Misappropriation of Malaitan Labour' in The Journal of Pacific History 42, no.2 (2007): 211-232, 
pp.217-218
8 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis: The historical causes for a failing state in the Solomon Islands, 1998-2004, 
Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2004, p.74
9 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, p.247
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guidance of Reverend Richard Fallows, petitioned the government for technical schools, medical 
clinics, higher wages, that the administration of the Solomon Islands not to be handed over to 
Australia, and fair prices for copra.
10 Essentially these protests were about the lack of development 
assistance the government provided in return for taxes collected.
From WWII to Independence
The effect of World War II on the Solomon Islands is difficult to overstate. From the perspective of 
decolonisation two points are essential. Firstly, a destabilisation of global geopolitics tied the 
political reality of the Pacific Islands to the ever-changing interests of colonial masters.  
Years before Japan's defeat, politicians in London, Paris, Washington, Canberra and Wellington 
had already commenced designing a new Pacific. But because each power entertained different 
agendas...it was an imbalanced, inconsistent and, as ever, inequitable initiative which yielded 
the Pacific chessboard still wrestled over today.
11 
Secondly, the war and particularly the politics imparted by African-American soldiers influenced 
the emergence of several social movements. 
The Society for the Development of Native Races in Western Guadalcanal organised around 
demands for formal education, economic development, political representation and codifying 
customary law.
12 The indigenous breakaway Christian Fellowship Church in the Western Solomons 
focused on providing grass-roots welfare services when the Methodist Church and government were 
seen to be failing the people. In 1957-1958, the Moro Movement in Guadalcanal advocated for and 
organised the development of self-sufficiency, land rights and a revival of kastom.
13 The heavy 
concentration of development on Guadalcanal and the accompanying influx of migrants had fuelled 
resentment over the alienation of land, the lack of rent and other benefits received and the perceived 
10 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, pp.261-263
11 Steven Fischer. A History of the Pacific Islands, 2002, New York: Palgrave, p.211
12 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, p.299
13 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, p.316
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erosion of Guadalcanal's culture as other migrants brought different customs with them. Reacting 
against the lack of development on Malaita that had driven Malaitans to sell themselves as labourers 
on foreign shores, Maasina Ruru, supported by up to 96% of Malaitans, withdrew labour from the 
protectorate in protest and demanded equitable development on Malaita and more power in decision 
making.
14  Jonothon Fifi'i
15  provides a vision of Maasina Ruru as a movement for both locally 
controlled development and preserving  kastom. After government repression and the arrest of 
thousands of followers, as well as some moderate success, Maasina Ruru ended and Malaitans again 
made up a substantial portion of the domestic labour trade. Kabutaulaka cites that, by 1981, Malaita 
was home to 31% of the population of the Solomon Islands but still only had 7% of the employment 
opportunities.
16 In contrast to the underdevelopment of Malaita, Guadalcanal was home to oil palm 
plantations, the gold ridge gold mine and the capital city, Honiara, all of which involved migrant 
labour and land alienation from traditional owners from the 1950s to 1998.
17 
In 1974, Britain faced the global fuel crisis  and integration into the European Economic 
Community, and lost interest in its Pacific colonies. At this point, slow decolonisation was 
abandoned and the Solomon Islands, without having a unified independence movement against 
British colonialism, had independence thrust upon it in 1978.
18  The independent government 
inherited an intact colonial architecture together with its peoples' animosity towards the central 
Honiara government. As a consequence of Britain's inconsistent treatment of different islands, 
lasting regional divisions were created within the Solomon Islands. During colonial rule, Britain 
also turned people of different islands against each other, for example by using a “Western Solomon 
14 Clive Moore. 'The Misappropriation of Malaitan Labour', p.244
15 Jonathan Fifi'i. From Pig Theft to Parliament: My Life Between Two Worlds, Honiara, 1989, see chapter 5, pp. 60-77
16 These figures relate to 1981, however the situation is said to have become more extreme during the following 
decade -  Tarcisius T.   Kabutaulaka.  'Beyond  Ethnicity:  the  political  economy  of  the  Guadacanal  crisis  in  the 
Solomon Islands' State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Working Paper 01/1, 2001, Available at: 
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/41949         
17 Clive Moore. 'The Misappropriation of Malaitan Labour' p.226
18 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons p. 321
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militia”
19  to arrest and suppress the Maasina Ruru movement on Malaita. The animosity and 
mistrust from this history continues well into the twenty first century. 
From independence to 'the tensions'
The Solomon Islands' inheritance from the British was a palimpsest: a modern, western and 
specifically British form of government imposed on top of continuing diverse traditions and 
cultures.
 Instead of combining the best of two systems, the Solomon Islands may have inherited the 
worst, or at least an incompatible mix of Indigenous values and European government. Four major 
and related issue-areas dominated politics in the Solomon Islands during the decades following 
independence: foreign dependence, regionalism, the logging industry and conflict between 'kastom' 
and Western styles of government. 
Foreign Dependence
Epeli Hau'ofa observed in 1978 that: “The main beneficiaries [of south pacific island integration 
into regional economies] are the privileged, elite groups all over the region.”
20 The years after 
independence surely confirmed this  assertion as a growing elite became dependent on an 
international cash economy involving the export of logs, fish, palm oil, copra, cocoa and gold. 
Another main source of income for the Solomon Islands is foreign aid: by 1990, aid accounted for 
22% of GDP.
21 As the government was almost constantly facing bankruptcy during the 90s, this aid 
money was critical to its survival. Unfortunately, exports and aid have done little for the majority of 
Solomon Islanders, 84 per cent of whom are still subsistence farmers.
22 Moreover, the reliance on 
aid and a small number of primary resource-exports has stopped or even reversed the decolonisation 
19 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons p.295
20 Epeli Hau'ofa.  'The New South Pacific Society: Integration and Independence' in Class and Culture in the South 
Pacific edited by A. Hooper et. al.,  1-15, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1978, p.2
21 Asian Development Bank. Solomon Islands Economic Report 2010, Manilla: ADB, 2011, p.6
22 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis, p.69
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process as foreign dependence, inequality and the centralisation of power have grown. In the words 
of Malama Meleisea: “The uncritical acceptance of development leads us to demolish our 
traditional institutions and create new ones in the expectation that our economies will grow and that 
we will all be better off.”
23 These process of globalisation, or at least regionalisation, cemented in 
place the Westminster style of centralised government and further frustrating those advocating for 
devolution, equitable development and recognition of kastom.  
Regionalism
Provincial governments and the earlier district councils became the primary voices of regionalism 
in most parts of the country, taking over where the earlier social movements had left off. The 
process of setting up local councils, largely in response to the continued agitation of social 
movements for local representation, devolution and decentralisation of power, began as early as the 
1930s and by the 1950s all the larger islands had district councils.
24 These councils were usually 
governed by a council of elders and were “entrusted with demarcating the borders of various clans, 
codifying custom and setting up district courts.”
25 In 1981, under the Mamaloni government, these 
councils were incorporated into a new system of provincial government.
26 Demands for continued 
devolution of power persisted, resurfacing in a 1987 constitutional review
27 and was one of the 
primary grievances of the militants who began fighting in 1998.
28 By the 1990s there were nine 
provincial governments and a separate council for the city of Honiara.
29 
23 Malama Meleisea. 'Ideology in Pacific Studies' in Class and Culture in the South Pacific edited by A. Hooper et. al., 
140-153, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1978, p.151
24 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands, Wellington: 
Victoria University Press, 2004, p.32
25 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.31
26 See Wilson Ifunaoa. 'Implementing Provincial Government' in Solomon Islands Politics, edited by Peter Larmour 
and Sue Tarua, 196-207, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1983
27 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis, p.47
28 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.37
29 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.213
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The Logging Industry
Since independence, logging had become the largest industry in the Solomon Islands. From 1990 to 
1998, timber accounted for 45 per cent of Solomon Islands exports.
30 Timber exports were worth 
S$349 million in 1999 and contributed 20 per cent to government revenue.
31 An analysis of the 
political economy of logging reveals that these figures alone fail to represent the importance of this 
industry. Logging money from East Asian firms injected cash directly into local communities, 
through the 'big-men' who negotiated contracts. This was often the only source of cash available to 
the majority of the population, many of whom still lived in very remote areas and survived on 
subsistence agriculture. Furthermore, the 'big-men' who negotiated logging contracts were able to 
distribute resources to their supporters and gain power, often using their influence to run for 
election to provincial or national parliament.
32 Vast patronage networks had developed by 1997, 
characterised by corruption, illegal tax breaks, and control of the limited supply of cash in the 
economy and the resultant political power. In 1997 alone it is estimated that the government missed 
out on S$70 million through remissions and exemptions on  export duty granted to logging 
companies.
33 Logging has also precipitated localised conflict, as communities are split into those 
who benefit from logging and those who oppose it on the grounds of erosion of fertile soil, the 
degradation of ecosystems,  protecting sacred sites, or a preference for traditional life over 
modernisation driven by cash.
34 
30 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.39
31 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis, p.76
32 Shahar Hameiri. 'Mitigating the risk to primitive accumulation: State-building and the Logging Boom in the 
Solomon Islands'  Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, no.3 (2012): 405-426
33 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.41
34 For examples of localised conflict see: Russell Hawkins. Since the Company Came, Ronin Films, videocassette 
(VHS), 2000
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Parliamentary Coalitions and Kastom
A major problem is the supposed incompatability between the Westminster system of parliament 
and Melanesian Kastom. Kwa'iola and Burt express the view that the prime-ministerial system is 
part of a colonial architecture that devalued elements of Kastom, such as the matrilinial inheritance 
of land rights (on Guadalcanal) and relationships between family groups.
35  On the other hand, 
Moore emphasises elements of Kastom which prevented liberal democracy working the way it did 
in Europe: 
Between 1970 and 1997, Solomon Islands developed a style of government in which a few key 
men dominated political leadership. There was no loyalty to political ideologies or parties... 
Politicians were far more beholden to their extended families than to their wider electorates. 
There had been little decentralisation of government processes, and tension built up between the 
regions and the central government. Issues such as inequities in infrastructure development, 
over-exploitation of resources and lack of compensation to Guadalcanal for hosting the capital 
city... There was a growing feeling that independence had not realised earlier hopes of creating a 
truly indigenous style of government.
36
Fraenkel places this tension and the manipulation of custom at the centre of the conflict and as a 
primary motive for militancy.
37  Politicians and militants were able  to demand and secure 
'compensation' payments from the government, using the language of traditional culture to mask 
greed, criminality and rent seeking.
Given this, the major challenge for politicians in the Solomon Islands was to establish a stable 
enough coalition of parties and independent MPs in order to form government. Fraenkel describes 
the key aspects of this phenomenon well: 
[the coalitions that formed government were] based on the weaving together of fragile power 
bases that drew on personal allegiances. MPs’ positions proved highly precarious. Elections 
were extraordinarily competitive. Political parties proved of limited significance. Around 50 per 
cent of incumbents lost their seats at each general election. To avoid defeat, parliamentarians 
had to bring home the bacon, switching sides if necessary in order to do so. […] Ministerial 
35 Michael Kwa'ioloa and Ben Burt. '“The Chiefs' Country”: A Malaitan view of the Conflict in the Solomon Islands', 
Oceania, 77, no.1 (2007): 111-127
36 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis, p.63
37 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom
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portfolios   gave   access   to   central   government   funds,   and   permitted   parliamentarians   to 
redistribute gains to political allies or to wantoks
38 back in rural villages.
39 
This style of politics, driven by the ability to distribute resources rather than by ideology, produced 
vast self-sustaining patronage networks from the Prime Minister to  local villages and often 
intimately   connected   to   the   logging   industry.
40  This   system  proved   to   be   sustainable   by 
incorporating potential dissidents into patronage networks. It only unravelled when money began to 
dry up during the Asian Financial Crisis, which paved the way for popular grievances such as land 
rights, inequitable development and migration patterns to again take centre stage. 
In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis hit Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, three of the larger export 
destinations for logs from Solomon Islands. The collapse of the logging boom sent shocks through 
the patronage networks, which had been sustained by the cash received for logs. In the wake of the 
financial crisis and discontent over the Mamaloni government's poor financial management 
(particularly the lost revenue from corruption in the logging industry), Bartholomew Ulufa'alu's 
Solomon Islands Alliance for Change coalition was elected into government in 1997. Assisted by 
the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he initiated a 
programme of structural reform, focused on the neo-liberal objectives of privatisation, reducing 
government debt and downsizing the public sector.
41 The corrupt practices of the logging industry 
were also in the line of fire of these reforms. The downsizing of the public sector – 447 government 
employees were made redundant by March 1999 – was a major factor in Uluafa'alu's declining 
38 Wantok is a pijin word which roughly translates to an extended family network, including everyone speaking the 
same dialect, not necessarily related by blood or marriage. 
39 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, pp 38-39
40 The exception to this generalisation are the various political parties that have sprung out of the trade union 
movement, these however have proven largely unsuccessful for a variety of reasons: see Bart Ulufa'alu. 'The 
Development of Political Parties' in Solomon Islands Politics, edited by Peter Larmour and Sue Tarua, 101-106, 
Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1983 and  Bart Ulufa'alu. 'Trade Unions and Politics' in Solomon Islands 
Politics, edited by Peter Larmour and Sue Tarua, 117-132, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1983 
41 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.41
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popularity.
42 The civil service was one of the largest sources of cash for Solomon Islanders and had 
supported a growing professional class in Honiara. Just as the Asian Financial Crisis had seen a 
decline in the cash economy fuelled by the logging industry, the redundancies saw more cash 
removed from society and opened more space for grievances centring on inequality to take centre 
stage.
43 
Indeed, Allen locates the proximate triggers of conflict as the “the disruption to political patronage 
networks engendered by the impact, in the late 1990s, of declining demand for Solomons log 
exports due to the Asian financial crisis [and] the subsequent donor-inspired, structural reform 
agenda of the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change government that came to power in 1997.”
44 As 
'big-men' lost influence and cash dried up, space was created for alternative political agendas. 
Especially on Guadalcanal, resentment grew at the lack of compensation received for the alienation 
of large tracts of land. Without logging money and without benefits from land alienation, political 
leaders on Guadalcanal began to organise around their long held grievances in order to obtain land 
rights, rent and recognition of kastom.
'The tensions'
As we have already seen, vast social differences existed in the Solomon Islands. Perhaps the biggest 
flash point was always going to be the area around Honiara on Guadalcanal, where a convergence 
of grievances had centred on foreign-owned capitalist projects. The Solomon Island Plantations 
Limited plantations, the Gold Ridge mine and urban Honiara had simultaneously fuelled a corrupt 
political machine, alienated Guadalcanal traditional owners from their land and objectified 
42 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.42
43 For another version of this argument see: Matthew Allen. 'Long-term engagement: The future of the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands', Strategic Insights 51, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(2011)
44 Mathew Allen. 'Long-term engagement' p.5; see also Shahar Hameiri. 'State Building or Crisis Management? A 
critical analysis of the social and political implications of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands', 
Third World Quarterly 30, no.1 (2009): 35-52
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Malaitans as a source of cheap labour.
45 The peaceful calls of successive movements for equitable 
development, devolution and land rights, made by so many people over the last century, from 
Maasina Ruru to the Moro Movement to the provincial governments, had all been ignored by 
power-holders. 
July 1998 saw the first militant actions taken by the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army, later 
renamed the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM). The IFM was widely viewed as an armed wing of 
the Guadalcanal Provincial Council's leadership. Premier Ezekiel Alebua made several apparently 
threatening speeches in the months following the outbreak of violence
46 and in February 1999 the 
Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly published a list of 13 demands. These demands included: 
devolution of power, income, and assets, including shares in SIPL and land titles on Guadalcanal, to 
the Guadalcanal Provincial Council; reform of the constitution and legislation to provide for kastom 
and regulate migration and land ownership; compensation for the alleged murder of Guale people; 
and relocating the national capital.
47 Two things are immediately striking about this list of demands: 
firstly the similarity of grievances to those articulated by previous social movements and provincial 
councils, and secondly the intense parochialism. Demands for land rights, devolution of political 
power, and equitable development are forcefully articulated next to and perhaps even underwritten 
by a toxic understanding of difference. People from other provinces, particularly Malaita, are 
implicitly blamed for the injustices on Guadalcanal, rather than the people directly profiting from 
the simultaneous exploitation of land on Guadalcanal and Malaitan labour, namely national and 
international corporations and venal politicians. 
45 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis
46 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, pp.44-45 
47 For the full text of the demands see 'apendix 2' in Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. pp.197-203
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The main focus of the IFM's violence was the many Malaitan settlers on Guadalcanal, who worked 
on the SIPL plantations and other projects on the northern plains of Guadalcanal, who lived in 
villages near their workplaces and in slums around Honiara, and even those who had married into 
Guale families. Attacks focused on the Gold Ridge gold mine, plantations, schools and villagers 
with large internal immigrant populations. People were threatened to leave, businesses closed and 
villages were abandoned. By the end of 1999 over 35,000 people had been displaced, most of these 
had fled to Honiara or Malaita.
48 
In May 1999 prime-minister Uluafa'alu, recognising the long standing grievances of Guale people, 
conceded some of the demands made by the Guadalcanal Provincial Council, including handing 
over SI$500,000, and promised to consider state government, handing over of some SIPL shares 
and some form of resource sharing.
49 These concessions, however, failed to stop the IFM from 
continuing with the evictions of Malaitans from rural Guadalcanal – the violence actually escalated 
with thousands more evicted and at least three people killed.
50 Further attempts at peace were made: 
in June 1999 the Honiara Accord was signed with the government again promising to review 
legislation around land rights and resource sharing, in exchange for militia leaders promising to 
disarm and disband.
51 This however did not happen, whether because the political leaders had little 
control over the militants themselves,
52 because they did not trust the government to make good on 
its promises, or because the cash extracted through violence was too attractive to give up. 
Regardless of the reason, many authors point to the growing practice of corruption and extortion 
practiced by militants. The government further responded to this violence by offering more 
48 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.55
49 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.65
50 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.66
51 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.70
52 The GRA/IFM leaders were not present at these negotiations, leaving the Guadalcanal Provincial Council to 
negotiate on behalf of Guadalcanal.
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'compensation'  deals. A further SI$2.5 million cheque was given to the Guadalcanal Provincial 
Council and SI$1,000 promised to each Malaitan displaced by the conflict.
53 
The Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) formed in January 2000 as a militia designed to defend Malaitans 
living in and around Honiara against the IFM. Much of the police force was Malaitan and 
reportedly many police officers collaborated with and even defected to join the MEF. In June 2000 a 
'joint operation' between the MEF and members of the Solomon Islands Police Force raided the 
main police armoury at Rove and took high-powered weaponry and supplies.
54 The situation then 
turned into a kind of civil war between two armed factions; violence escalated more people were 
forced to flee, this time from Honiara back to rural Guadalcanal and other islands. In June 2000 
Prime Minister Uluafa'alu was forced to resign at gun point in an MEF-led coup and was eventually 
replaced by Manasseh Sogavare.
55 
A further attempt at peace was made following this escalation of conflict. On October 15 2000 the 
Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA), facilitated by the Australian and New Zealand governments, 
was negotiated between the leaders of the IFM, the MEF, national politicians and provincial 
premiers. The agreement provided that all sides were to lay down arms and disband their militias 
and for an International Peace Monitoring Team to be deployed.
56 An important element of the 
agreement was a government commitment to “a set of extraordinarily ambitious schemes for public 
works on Malaita and Guadalcanal”
57  – effectively recognising the fundamental grievances of 
militias about inequitable development. While the TPA brought an end to formal conflict between 
the IFM and MEF, only a small portion of the estimated weapons possessed by militants were 
53 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.67 & p.80
54 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.87
55 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.93
56 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.99
57 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.100
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handed in and huge compensation payments, especially to former militant leaders, set the scene for 
“ransacking the state”.
58 Fraenkel refers to this phenomenon as 'the manipulation of custom' because 
'traditional' notions of customary compensation were manipulated and levelled against the national 
government in order to extort cash. Sogavare admitted that SI$40 million had been paid out in 
'bogus' compensation claims by April 2001
59 and a further SI$28 million was granted in import and 
export duty remissions.
The economic cost of the conflict was devastating. Disruption to logging, fisheries, plantations and 
the Gold Ridge gold mine saw a drop in real GDP of 14.1 per cent in 2000.
60 By 2002 the state had 
become “totally bankrupt” with government debt at A$430 million.
61 With no military, and a police 
force that had largely joined the militias, the Solomon Islands government was virtually powerless 
to stop the conflict. Critical infrastructure was failing because of the lack of money, and the case 
was made that the Solomon Islands had become a 'failed state'. Calls for international assistance 
were being made from everyone – three successive Prime Ministers, political commentators, the 
Civil Society Network, academics and churches. The Solomon Islands government declared itself a 
'failed state' in need of international assistance in order to restore peace, government control and 
eventually sovereignty. Just months before the 2000 coup, Australia had refused the then Prime 
Minister Ulafa'alu's requests for military intervention.
62
The RAMSI intervention
In 2003 Australian Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer announced the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. This was a complete turnaround for the Australian 
58 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.106
59 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.122
60 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom. p.89
61 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis. p.180
62 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis. p.198
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Government and the Foreign Minister in particular who, only months earlier had gone on record 
stating that:
Sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It 
would be widely resented in the Pacific region. […] foreigners do not have the answers for 
deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon Islands.
63
As discussed in chapter one, the RAMSI intervention followed a changing attitude in Australian 
foreign policy decision-making circles about non-traditional security threats globally and the 'arc of 
instability' in the South Pacific, with the Solomon Islands representing the most 'fragile' state, if not 
the first 'failed state' in the region. One of the most important ingredients of the intervention, from 
the point of view of the Australian government, was obtaining the consent not just of the Solomon 
Islands government but also of other Pacific Island states. Before any troops hit the ground, the then 
Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza visited Canberra to make a formal request for assistance, 
members of the Pacific Islands Forum signed the RAMSI treaty and the Solomon Islands parliament 
has passed the Facilitation of International Assistance Act.
64
RAMSI, by all accounts, had initial positive impacts in the Solomon Islands and particularly in 
Honiara where violence and crime dramatically decreased. In the first few weeks of the mission, 
over 2,500 weapons were handed in.
65 By November, 1,340 people had been arrested, including 25 
police officers,
66 and peace returned to the Solomon Islands. However Australian motivations for 
intervention were not restricted to the stabilisation of Solomon Islands. The 2003 policy document 
Our Failing Neighbour informed much of the Australian Government's policy. It identifies three 
motivations   for   intervention:   preventing   the   Solomon   Islands   becoming   “a   petri   dish   of 
63 Tarcisius T. Kabutaulaka. 'Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI intervention', Contemporary Pacific 17, no.2 
(2005): 283-310
64 Graeme Wilson.  The Solomon Islands Government – RAMSI partnership framework: Towards a secure and 
sustainable Solomon Islands, Address to State Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, Canberra: ANU, 
2009
65 Clive Moore. Happy Isles in Crisis, p.212
66 Jon Fraenkel. The Manipulation of Custom, p.175
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transnational crime” including terrorism; trade interests worth A$106 million annually to Australia; 
and Australia's international prestige.
67 
RAMSI's reform agenda was discusses in detail in chapter two, here I will outline some of the 
tensions that have existed between RAMSI and local actors. A significant voice of opposition to 
RAMSI has been the Ma'asina Forum, a Malaitan based organisation formed in 2003. The Ma'asina 
forum has continually criticised RAMSI, particularly for ignoring and devaluing Melanesian 
kastom and for the immunity from Solomon Islands law which RAMSI personnel are granted under 
the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003. The views of the Ma'asina Forum reflect a 
small but significant opposition to the perceived continuation of the supremacy of Western 
government over tradition, and they explicitly predict that this could lead to further acts of 
resistance, even violence.
68 
One of the most dramatic events to have occurred since the 2003 intervention was the  April 2006 
riots following the election of Synder Rini as Prime Minister. The riots saw most of Chinatown in 
Honiara burnt to the ground and RAMSI was largely blamed for failing to anticipate and prevent the 
riots from getting out of control.
69  Moore argues that the riots were politically motivated, 
methodical and targeted specific 'new' Chinese businesses and RAMSI personnel, vehicles, and 
places associated with the intervention, signifying a deep failure to address inequality in the years 
following the conflict.
70 During the riots, significant anti-RAMSI feeling was evidenced by graffiti 
sprayed on buildings and on burnt out police wagons that read 'fuck RAMSI'.
71  Synder Rini 
67 Elsina Wainwright. Our Failing Neighbour, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2001
68 Matthew G. Allen. 'Resisting RAMSI: Intervention, Identity and Symbolism in the Solomon Islands', Oceania 79, 
no.1 (2009): 1-17, pp11-12
69 Joel Atkinson. 'Big Trouble in Little Chinatown: Australia, Taiwan and the April 2006 Post Election Riot in the 
Solomon Islands', Pacific Affairs 81, no.1 (2009): 47-65
70 Clive Moore. 'No more walkabout long Chinatown: Asian involvement in the economic and political process' in 
Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands, Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2008
71 Matthew G. Allen. 'Resisting RAMSI', p.13
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subsequently resigned and Manasseh Sogavare was elected as Prime Minister 16 days after the riots 
broke out.
Sogavare had been one of the few public critics of RAMSI in Solomon Islands Parliament, calling 
other ministers “puppets of foreign governments”
72 for supporting RAMSI. This was most likely 
empty rhetoric designed to play on a small but popular anti-RAMSI sentiment that had developed, 
because when it counted, Sogavare supported RAMSI: during an earlier term as Prime Minister in 
2000-2001 he had called for foreign intervention and he had voted for the  Facilitation of 
International Assistance Act in 2003. Regardless of the content of prior rhetoric, several issues 
emerged in 2006 that Sogavare fought RAMSI over. One of Sogavare's first moves as Prime 
Minister in 2006 was an attempt to establish an inquiry into the riots, which RAMSI and the 
Australian Government bitterly opposed, perhaps because they wished to avoid the spotlight on 
their biggest failure to keep peace in Honiara. When Australia's High Commissioner in the Solomon 
Islands was reported to have lobbied donors not to fund the inquiry, he was expelled from the 
country. When the Attorney-General took Australia's side and refused to establish the inquiry, he 
was stood down by Sogavare on September 21, 2006 and replaced by Australian Julian Moti in July 
2007.
73 Sogavare used the opportunity to articulate a broader issue with RAMSI's approach:
Lasting peace could not come to Solomon Islands until and unless all the underlying issues were 
fully addressed... For foreigners to think they would address peace in Solomon Islands by heavy 
handed legalistic approach was a wistful [sic] thinking.
74
Sogavare also pursued the policy of re-arming the police force using aid money from Taiwan, which 
was successfully opposed by RAMSI and the Australian government.
75 Although these issues were 
all but forgotten after the elections of Derek Sikua and Kevin Rudd respectively as Prime Ministers 
72 Jon Fraenkel. 'The Impact of RAMSI on the 2006 Elections in the Solomon Islands', Political Science 58, no.2 
(2006): 63-85, p.71
73 Joel Atkinson. 'Big Trouble in Little Chinatown', p.62
74 Deli Oso. 'PM Explains Why He Expel Mr Cole' Solomon Star, 19 September 2006 , quoted in: Joel Atkinson. 'Big 
Trouble in Little Chinatown', p.61
75 Joel Atkinson. 'Big Trouble in Little Chinatown', p.63
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in 2007, they clearly demonstrate a level of unwillingness from RAMSI and the Australian 
Government to take grievances seriously. 
A history of struggles against inequality 
As we have seen from the examination of social movements, inequality has consistently fuelled the 
anger and jealousy of Solomon Islanders who miss out on the (mixed) benefits of development. In 
reality this inequality benefits neither Malaitan labourers or Guale peasants, but a centralised elite 
who have benefited from tax revenue and several transnational corporations and investors, as profits 
from plantations, mines and forests have been repatriated to Australia, Malaysia and across the 
globe.  The Gizo Revolt, the Rule and Chair Movement,  Massina Ruru, the Society for the 
Development of Native Races, the Christian Fellowship Church and the Moro Movement were all 
independent movements, yet all articulated similar desires: the devolution and decentralisation of 
political   power,   the   codification   of  kastom  into   law,   land   rights   and   equitable   economic 
development.
76 
These social movements only ever achieved partial success in the form of concessions made by the 
central government; they were ultimately ignored or repressed. The disputes and grievances were 
never resolved. As we have seen, many of the same grievances, especially the devolution of 
political power and equitable development, were later taken up by provincial councils and local 
politicians in the post-independence period, who achieved similar limited results. It is hardly 
surprising then that, in a time of economic downturn following the Asian Financial Crisis, these 
fundamental grievances resurfaced, although this time the claimants used violence to back up the 
demands. The demands articulated by the Guadalcanal Provincial Council and the IFM constitute 
the self-identified reasons for initiating armed conflict, given the almost total failure of previous 
76 Judith A. Bennett. Wealth of the Solomons, 297-299, see also: Hugh Laracy. Pacific Protest: The Massina Rule 
Movement Solomon Islands: 1944-1952, Suva: Institute for Pacific Studies,1983, p.21
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non-violent attempts to satisfy these demands. The pre-RAMSI peace process, while largely failing 
to convince militants to disarm or disband, acknowledged inequality as the primary cause of 
conflict and attempted to redress the situation through promising more appropriate development 
projects and compensation payments. Unfortunately, by the time the state moved to address the 
issues, militia leaders were in a sufficiently powerful position to manipulate and corrupt the process 
of compensation. Finally, there are glimpses of these grievances persisting in the post-intervention 
Solomon Islands: the 2006 riots targeted RAMSI vehicles and property, along with 'new' Chinese 
immigrants; groups such as the Ma'asina Forum claim RAMSI is continuing the same inequitable 
and pro-western politics as the post-colonial governments had done; politicians, Sogavare in 
particular, continue to criticise RAMSI for the persisting centralisation of power and development 
that its policies promote. 
RAMSI's Account of Conflict 
In contrast to the narrative presented in this chapter, RAMSI provides this explanation for the 
causes of the conflict:
After five years of ethnic tensions, and a coup in 2000, the problems facing this troubled nation 
were many and serious. Law and order had broken down, officials and private citizens were 
subject to intimidation and violence, and corruption was unfettered. The Government and its 
institutions had ceased to function effectively. Corruption was widespread. Public finances were 
in ruin and many of the most basic services such as health and education were not being 
delivered to the people.
77
From this statement, the most detailed offered on RAMSI's website, it seems that the causes of 
conflict are totally ignored in favour of describing a few of the symptoms. The  Our Failing 
Neighbour report, which provided the initial blueprint for the intervention elaborates a little more 
on the perceived causes of conflict in the Solomon Islands:
The weak post-independence governments with inadequate revenue bases struggling for 
legitimacy against older, more deeply rooted political and social traditions. The poor economic 
performance and high population growth that fuels disappointed expectations and tensions over 
77 RAMSI. Why RAMSI was formed [online],     http://www.ramsi.org/about/history.html    ,     accessed September 6 2012 
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land. The tribal differences sparking violence on a level that challenges the capacity and 
authority of the state. The state’s role replaced by non-state actors working with or without the 
trappings of constitutional office. The rule of law collapsing, and the descent into corruption and 
criminality.
78
No mention is made of the demands articulated by the Guadalcanal Provincial Council, nor of the 
grievances that previous social movements articulated and clearly animated many people. Hameiri 
extrapolates and explains how RAMSI's interpretation of the causes of conflict are based on a 
homogenised notion of 'state-failure', defined by the absence or poor functioning of “universally 
valid governance institutions.”
79 As Allen observes: “there is a potent danger in portraying the 
conflict solely in terms of greed and criminality, which is the interpretation which appears to have 
informed the architecture and approach of RAMSI.”
80 The danger is precisely that the inequalities 
will be perpetuated, further fuelling grievances and undermining long-term stability. 
Conclusion
The historical causes of conflict are multiple and complex. I do not attempt to authoritatively or 
objectively state the definite causes of conflict, I merely wish to illuminate some of the various 
causes, as articulated by various actors throughout the history of the Solomon Islands, and show 
that they can not be reduced to ethnic conflict, poor economic growth or a simple lack of ‘good 
governance’ structures in the neo-liberal mould. The picture painted by the historical narrative 
constructed in this chapter points to the overwhelmingly political causes of the conflict: inequitable 
development practices, the continued centralisation of political power and the continued supremacy 
of western forms of governance over recognition of kastom and tradition. 
78 Elsina Wainwright. Our Failing Neighbour, p.18
79 Shahar Hameiri. 'The Trouble with RAMSI: Reexamining the Roots of Conflict in the Solomon Islands' 
Contemporary Pacific 19, no.9 (2007): 409-441 p.423
80 Mathew Allen. 'Contemporary Histories of the Conflict in the Solomon Islands' [book review] in Ocieania 76, no.3 
(2006): 310-315, p.312 
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In chapter one I reviewed the relevant literature about neo-liberalism in Australian foreign policy 
and argued that RAMSI's programme is based upon a neo-liberal institutionalist set of prescriptions 
for functioning statehood. In chapter two, the specifics of RAMSI's reform agenda were examined. 
There is no room, either in neo-liberal ideology, or in RAMSI's agenda, for intervention around the 
issues raised in this chapter, specifically to uphold collective land rights, consider tradition or 
custom in policy making spaces, direct development in an equitable fashion, or to devolve (or even 
democratise) political power. This is why RAMSI’s programs have had to ignore the root causes of 
conflict; acknowledging the fundamental grievances that led to conflict is incompatible with 
RAMSI's driving ideology and programme. The obvious danger here is that these grievances will 
remain unresolved and even exasperated by the neo-liberal straight-jacket that RAMSI is placing on 
Solomon Islands institutions. In the next chapter I examine some specific instances where RAMSI 
has not only ignored the root causes of conflict but is actually replicating dynamics within the 
political economy of the Solomon Islands that led to conflict in 1998 and could forseeably lead to 
further conflict in the future.
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Introduction
Development failures and instability in the South Pacific cannot be reduced to 
problems of governance; they can however be analysed as questions of political 
economy. There is a radical disconnect between the neo-liberal economic model of 
private sector-led growth regulated by a state based on 'good governance' and the 
economic reality of island states in the Pacific. In reality, the creation of institutions 
supportive of market societies is no guarantee that private sector investment will 
occur or that if it does that it will be in enterprises that are sustainable, equitable or 
respectful of local contexts. 
Perhaps the most obvious failing of RAMSI, even within the definition of a neo-
liberal programme, is that the private sector has not come to the rescue of poor 
people, provided equitable development or security. Growth in GDP has remained at 
5 per cent or higher since the RAMSI intervention, with the exception of 2009, when 
GDP shrunk by 1.2 per cent amidst the global financial crisis, in 2011 GDP grew by 
10.7 per cent,
1 which could perhaps be taken as a sign of the success of RAMSI. 
However, the majority of this growth is underpinned by the agricultural sector – as of 
2011, agriculture accounted for 54.3 per cent of GDP
2  – which includes both 
subsistence  agriculture, the antithesis  of the  private  sector,
  and  forestry.  The 
economic 'success' of RAMSI is then revealed to be based mainly on a new boom in 
logging. The main effects of the transformation described in chapter two, have been 
1 Asian Development Bank. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific – Solomon Islands, Manilla: 
Asian Development Bank, 2012 
2 Asian Development Bank. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific – Solomon Islands
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to recreate and accentuate the conditions that led to the outbreak of violent conflict in 1998 and 
hence undermine the stated objectives of stability and security. Instead, RAMSI is facilitating 
processes of primitive accumulation and constructing a new Australian hegemony in the South 
Pacific.
This chapter focuses on three key areas of the political economy in the Solomon Islands in which 
the effects of RAMSI's reforms has been to perpetuate the fundamental grievances which led to the 
outbreak of conflict in 1998. The aid bubble associated with RAMSI has created an inflationary 
economy and a concentration of services in Honiara, exacerbating problems of inequality. Logging 
is the largest industry in the Solomon Islands and has been largely responsible for recent economic 
growth; however, it is dangerously unsustainable and without regulation will collapse within the 
next five years. The political economy of land rights and development, as I argued in chapter three, 
was largely responsible for the outbreak of tensions and while significant pressure exists for land 
reform, especially from the World Bank and neo-liberal think-tanks in Australia, the issue has 
largely been ignored by RAMSI. Although neo-liberal reforms around land-rights are not being 
seriously considered by RAMSI, neither has there been an attempt to resolve the significant tension 
between land rights as understood traditionally and under the modern state as well as significant 
discontent about continued inequitable development. Such tension and discontent, left unaddressed, 
could forseeably erupt into renewed conflict. The contradiction highlighted here is that the 
economic and governance reforms that RAMSI advocates have had the consequence, intended or 
otherwise, of re-creating the same grievances led to the outbreak of conflict in 1998.
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Aid Bubble
The strategy described in the chapter two of focusing on building the capacity of institutions and 
creating regulation, while largely excluding direct development of infrastructure and industry has 
resulted in the creation of what Anderson has called the 'aid bubble' in Honiara. This presents three 
related problems: “an inflationary ‘enclave bubble economy’, failures in human and institutional 
capacity building and relative deprivation.”
3   Essentially this means that as highly paid (mostly 
Australian) expatriate consultants create an economic bubble in Honiara, inflationary pressures 
disproportionately affect locals who receive relatively low wages. Discontent directed at RAMSI 
reflects this inequality. Alarmingly, inequality and the lack of equitable development were two of 
the key grievances that fuelled the militants who began fighting in 1998 and RAMSI seems to be 
exacerbating these issues, pointing to the likelyhood of further conflict in the future.  
Logging and Forests
In chapter two, I examined how the logging boom of the 1990s had facilitated the creation of vast 
patronage networks through the distribution of cash from logging companies, both providing the 
funding for many 'big men' to run election campaigns and the cash that politicians distributed in 
order to buy loyalties and placate dissent. I also argued that the reduction in log exports and cash 
following the Asian Financial Crisis, led to at least the partial collapse of these patronage networks 
and politicians' ability to placate dissent. This has been identified by many authors as one of the 
primary proximate triggers of conflict in 1998.
4
3 Tim Anderson. 'RAMSI: Intervention, Aid Trauma and Self Governance', Journal of Australian Political Economy 
62, (2008): 62-93, p.74
4 For example see Shahar Hameiri. 'Mitigating the risk to primitive accumulation: State-building and the Logging 
Boom in the Solomon Islands'  Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, no.3 (2012): 405-426 and Matthew Allen. 'Long 
Term Engagement: The Future of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands', Strategic Insights 51, 
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011
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It is particularly concerning that the recent economic growth in the Solomon Islands, seen as 
RAMSI's biggest 'success' after ending armed conflict, is based on another, even bigger boom in the 
logging industry. Hameiri's work has shown that although foreign investment increased from US$41 
million to US$303 million in the year following the implementation of the Foreign Investment Act 
2005:
5 
of the 38 new investments registered for the period between June 2006 and August 2007, the 
majority were in services industries in Honiara that presumably are intended to cater mainly for 
well-paid international staff. Yet, the seven new investments made in the forestry sector in that 
period, which were among a handful that actually increased productive output, had a value of 
approximately US$11.37 million out of US$41.47 million for all new investments, or 27%. The 
list of foreign investment re-registration – investments made by companies already operating – 
is even more heavily skewed towards the forestry industry with about 82% of the total going 
into either old-growth forest logging or plantation-logging ventures.
6
By 2010 logging had grown to account for “60 per cent of total merchandise exports, 16 per cent of 
government revenue and 16 per cent of GDP.”
7  Meaning that, in as far as  RAMSI has been 
successful in facilitating private sector growth, this has largely been confined to one particular 
industry, a risky position at the best of times, even if the that particular industry did not rely on a 
strictly non-renewable resource in short supply.  
As of 2010 it was estimated that the rate of logging was at six times the sustainable yield and at this 
rate it is estimated the resources will be totally depleted by 2015.
8 In 2011, log exports exceeded 1.9 
million cubic meters, up by one third from 2010.
9 While this is recognised as a serious problem by 
donors, such as the Asian Development Bank and AusAID, the strategy of “improving the 
environment for doing business” and “promoting the private sector”,
10 presumably in the hope that 
5 The Facilitation of International Investment act was one of the primary self identified successes of the Economic 
Governance and Growth pillar of RAMSI.
6 Shahar Hameiri. 'Mitigating the risk to primitive accumulation' p.421
7 Shahar Hameiri. 'Mitigating the risk to primitive accumulation' p.415
8 Matthew Allen. 'Long Term Engagement'
9 Asian Development Bank. 'Small Pacific Countries' in  Asian Development Outlook 2012: Confronting Rising 
Inequality in Asia, 239-249, Manilla: Asian Development Bank, 2012, p.245
10 Asian Development Bank. Solomon Islands: Roads/Routes to Success, Manilla: Asian Development Bank, 2012, p.3
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the private sector will diversify away from logging, remains ubiquitous and has only facilitated 
further investment in the logging industry. Given the immanent end of the logging industry, either 
as   costs   increase   and   volumes   decrease,   if   sustainable   logging   is   implemented,   or   when 
commercially viable forests are extinguished, the logging boom is set to burst, as it did in 1997-
1998. It is likely that RAMSI will lose much of its legitimacy as economic growth collapses and 
again, it will become harder to placate dissent and renewed conflict is likely. As Hameiri has 
articulated:
Through encouraging unsustainable development of fisheries and forests, centralisation of 
services in Honiara, 'money politics' and strong links between business and government, 
RAMSI is in danger of reproducing many of the same conflicts over resources that has 
characterised violence in colonial and post-colonial Solomon Islands, including the failure of 
the Government in 2003.
11 
While much attention is given to the 'sustainability' of reforms implemented with RAMSI's 
assistance,
12  there seems to be far less concern about the sustainability of the  environment or 
economy without which a return to violence seems far more likely. This is arguably the most 
concerning aspect of the governance transformations under-way: that focus and resources have 
shifted onto regulation and institutions while viable strategies for avoiding future conflict, equitable 
development and reconciliation are ignored.
One neo-liberal solution to the issue of deforestation (and global climate change) that is being 
proposed by various actors, particularly the UN and the World Bank, is REDD+ (Reducing 
Emissions   form Deforestation  and  Degradation  Plus).  REDD+  involves   forest  conservation 
initiatives in the global south, funded by the sale of carbon credits which are traded and sold to 
polluters and institutions in the global north.
13  The UN-REDD Programme started a national 
11 Shahar Hameiri. 'State Building or Crisis Management? A critical analysis of the social and political implications of 
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands', Third World Quarterly 30, no.1 (2009): 35-52, p.49
12 Sue Emmott, Manuhuia Barcham & Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, Annual Performance Report 2010
13 Coalition   for   Rainforest   Nations.  Coalition   for   Rainforest   Nations,  [accessed   October   1   2012], 
http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/
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programme for REDD+ readiness in 2011, focusing on the early stages of creating a carbon market, 
particularly stakeholder consultation, collecting forest data, and crating plans for future projects.
14 
The UN-REDD Programme is also aiming towards a regional (PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) 
approach to the regulation of measurement, reporting and verification systems.
15 Dehm explains 
how, similar to all neo-liberal markets:
carbon markets are dependant upon the state for specific functions, namely the creation of new 
forms of carbon property and the enforcement of rights in these and the  enforcement of 
contracts, without which carbon markets could not exist.
16
At the international level this means:
an internationally harmonised regulatory framework and market surveillance system, including 
a unified legal,  accounting and taxation framework, stricter access to registry accounts to 
prevent fraud, greater transparency, sanctions to discourage market abuse, market surveillance 
authority and greater coordination with upcoming markets.
17
In turn these state functions depend upon the kind of good governance, capacity-building, and law 
and order that RAMSI is attempting to implement in the Solomon Islands. In particular, they are 
reliant on political stability and an institutional structure that regulates for the production and 
maintenance of markets. Thus RAMSI provides a critical link between subsistence farmers and the 
global economy, enabling the continuation of privatisation and financialisation critical for capitalist 
reproduction. 
The one element critical to REDD+ which is not fully addressed by RAMSI is the issue of land 
tenure. Initial investigation by the UN had found that current systems of traditional land tenure are a 
major constraint to similar development projects:
The prevailing traditional system of landownership provides a welfare safety net for the vast 
majority of Solomon Islanders. Customary land tenure also supports the country's robust 
14 UN-REDD Programme, Initial National Programme Doccument – Solomon Islands, Washingtion D.C.: UN, 2010
15 UN-REDD Programme, Initial National Programme Doccument – Solomon Islands, p.15
16 Julia Dehm. 'Tricks of Perception and Perspective: the Disappearance of Law and Politics in Carbon Markets; 
Reading Alexandre Kossoy and Phillippe Ambrosi, 'State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010'', Macquarie 
Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law 7, no.2 (2011): 1-18, p.11
17 Julia Dehm. 'Tricks of Perception and Perspective', p.13
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village-based subsistence gardening. At the same time, customary ownership is regarded as a 
major constraint to large-scale development. Often it is problematic, costly and fraught with 
uncertainty due to the inevitable and often multiple disputes that arise between owners and 
developers, or between different landowner groups. Equally problematic is when the land is set 
aside for other public purposes, such as management of watersheds, protection of sites of 
special interest, or conserving environmentally-sensitive areas. While the national government 
has the power of compulsory land acquisition, using this power is regarded as undermining 
values of customary right of the people and gains political unpopularity.
18
In practice, the creation of carbon markets, specifically those based on REDD+, will require land 
tenure that is individual, tradeable and has clear geographic and legal boundaries and therefore will 
require land reform according to the neo-liberal model.
Land
Land tenure is often one of the most controversial issues in post-colonial states as struggles between 
'tradition' –  represented by communal, inalienable and often un-codified systems of land tenure – 
and 'modernity' – represented by individual, marketised, and codified systems – play out, often 
resulting in violent conflict. As I showed in chapter two, a slightly different version of struggles 
over land rights was one of the primary causes of conflict – as traditional Guale land was alienated 
by the state and immigrant labourers. Therefore, a clarification of land rights and tenure has often 
been cited as one of the primary ingredients necessary for reconciliation and avoiding future 
conflict.
19 Conflicting with this need to 'clarify' land tenure in the name of reconciliation is the neo-
liberal desire for land reform; that is, to legislate for individual and tradeable land rights. 
RAMSI hasn't attempted any large scale reform of land-rights, considering it outside its mandate.
20 
This is probably also because RAMSI officials are aware of the potential dissent such a process 
would likely create. Nevertheless, RAMSI has introduced individual legal land titles into rural 
areas, where previously only customary and collective land rights existed. Drumgold mentions one 
18 UN-REDD Programme. Initial National Programme Doccument – Solomon Islands, pp.9-10
19 Tim Anderson. 'RAMSI: Intervention, Aid Trauma and Self Governance', p.81
20 Elsina Wainwright. 'How is RAMSI faring? Progress, Challenges and Lessons Learned',  Strategic Insights  14, 
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005, p.10
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specific case from Ruaniu where the Solomon Islands Development Authority gave title over a 
coconut plantation to an Australian company without the knowledge of the traditional owners, 
resulting in a protracted legal battle which was only resolved (or forgotten) after the 2006 riots in 
Honiara.
21 
The decision by RAMSI that land reform is not part of its mandate is seen as one of its primary 
failings by neo-liberal scholars and think-tanks in Australia. Sodhi best represents this position. For 
him and the Centre for Independent Studies, the largest problem is that 85 per cent of Solomon 
Islanders still survive on subsistence farming, instead of participating in the cash economy, and land 
reform is the mechanism by which neo-liberalising projects seek to turn subsistence communities 
into cash economies. In Sodhi's words:
Agriculture is the key to raising rural living standards, and land tenure is the key impediment to 
raising agricultural output and incomes. Without land surveys, registration, and long-term leases 
there can be no progress.
22
Sodhi cites reports by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development 
Bank that support his position that “traditional land tenure” is a “constraint on growth.”
23 Sodhi 
doesn't stop at traditional forms of land tenure but also explicitly identifies traditional family 
structures as 'constraints on growth': 
The wontok system has long been recognised as a constraint on commercial  activity, as it stifles 
incentives to increase production and seek income earning opportunities. […] All traditional 
societies have had similar informal welfare systems. As coffee, cocoa and palm oil production 
developed,   welfare   systems   eroded.   Economic   policies   that  achieved   growth   overcame 
disincentives to work.
24
Such quintessentially neo-liberal views ignore two of the major causes of conflict in the Solomon 
Islands, mentioned in chapter two: struggles for the recognition of Kastom and traditional ways of 
21 Shane Drumgold. Palm Tree Justice, Canberra: Shane Drumgold, 2011, pp.119-132
22 Gaurav Sodhi. 'Five Out of Ten: A Performance Report on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands', 
Issue Analysis 92, The Centre for Independent Studies, 2008, p.2
23 Gaurav Sodhi. 'Five Out of Ten', p.9&19
24 Gaurav Sodhi. 'Five Out of Ten', p.12
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life and the fight for land rights. The kind of primitive accumulation and epistemic violence Sodhi 
proposes has the real potential to reignite conflict as people become alienated from their land and 
supportive family structures.  
Given the trajectory of neo-liberalism and the support for land reform from influential politicians, 
neo-liberal academics, think tanks as well as organisations such as the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, not to mention private companies, it seems inevitable that some kind of land 
reform initiative will be embarked upon in the future. This could provide a trigger for further 
conflict. If my speculations here are proven wrong and a push towards formalised individual and 
marketised land tenure does not develop, the point remains that a clarification of land tenure is still 
needed for purposes of reconciliation and stability. The fundamental confusion over land rights and 
processes of land alienation that contributed to conflict in 1998-2003 remain unresolved and so the 
potential for renewed conflict remains. 
Conclusion 
Economic growth in the Solomon Islands is based upon commercial logging, aid flows and the 
services bubble in Honiara. There are other avenues for development, however many of them are 
not particularly promising. The Gold Ridge gold mine has resumed production and will provide a 
small amount of export earnings. Agriculture including fisheries, palm oil and coconut plantations 
and tourism also make small contribution to GDP and export earnings which could grow. Carbon 
trading and REDD+ programmes also provide small hope, not just of economic recovery but of 
environmental conservation, however the international market is small, uncertainty abounds and 
already the Solomon Islands is a latecomer. One often cited solution to poverty is to open Australia's 
labour market to the South Pacific. All of these options, especially to the extent they promote 
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primitive accumulation and proletarianisation, are problematic because they have the potential to 
cause further conflict over land rights and equitable development, issues which must be resolved 
first, as the foundation for economic growth rather than as a side thought. Therefore, Australian 
foreign policy needs to shift its focus away from governance and marketisation onto direct equitable 
development that provides security and poverty reduction at a grass-roots level, while addressing 
the specific causes of conflict, if it is to achieve the goal of stability and security in the region. 
This brief analysis of key issues in Solomon Islands political economy reveals that RAMSI is 
perpetuating the underlying issues which caused the outbreak of conflict in 1998. Fundamental 
uncertainty and confusion persists around the issues of land tenure and land rights, which are caught 
in a deadlock between neo-liberal reformers and advocates of kastom; the logging industry and 'aid 
bubble' continue the trend towards greater economic inequality and the centralisation of political 
and economic power in the hands of Honiara elites, foreign bureaucrats and investors. Combine this 
analysis with the evidence presented in chapter two that RAMSI's neo-liberal model of state-
building is not only devaluing and de-legitimising traditional forms of governance but also 
centralising power and insulating decision-making from popular influence and the picture is one of 
a perfect storm. Rather than achieving its goals of stability and security, RAMSI is perpetuating 
instability in the Solomon Islands.   
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I have presented a view of neo-liberalism in this thesis as a kind of teleological 
imperative. The neo-liberal path to development and security follows a prescribed 
model that needs to be insulated from popular influence. The all important terminus 
of neo-liberalism is the creation of neo-liberal states, institutions and markets which 
support private sector led economic growth and free trade. However, in order to 
justify this model of politics, grand narratives about the failures of other systems 
must be constructed. In the case of the Solomon Islands, this narrative was about the 
outbreak of conflict which is said to be caused by corruption, poor governance, 
ethnic rivalries and stagnant economic growth. This formed part of and was in turn 
influenced by imaginations of an 'arc of instability' in the South Pacific (and also 
extending to Indonesia and Timor Leste) and a global order dominated by 'the war on 
terror'. Although, this would suggest that RAMSI is designed to provide security and 
stability for the region, I argue that, regardless of intention, it is more concerned with 
marketisation and privitisation of society in the Solomon Islands and building the 
institutions which  facilitate such processes. 
A long line of social movements, politicians and the militias themselves have 
consistently agitated around a fairly consistent set of issue-areas, which I identify as: 
inequitable development, land rights, the subordination of kastom, and the location of 
political power. RAMSI has done nothing to address these fundamental grievances in 
the Solomon Islands and thereby left the door open for renewed conflict around these 
issues after its guarantee of peace – provided by police and military – leave. In stark 
contrast, RAMSI and the Australian government have misrepresented the causes of 
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conflict to fit their neo-liberal ideology and programme to be centred around the lack of 'good 
governance' structures, poor economic growth and ethnic rivalries.  
Through this reinterpretation of conflict, RAMSI has framed recovery and peace in the Solomon 
Islands as conditional upon private-sector-led economic growth and the good governance structures 
which supposedly support it. However, there are serious indications that RAMSI has not only 
ignored the causes of conflict but that its good governance reforms are actually exacerbating these 
issues.  Modern Western rationalities of government have firmly established supremacy over 
traditional models. Political power is being further removed from popular influence as bureaucrats 
and politicians instead become accountable to transnational actors. Development patterns are at the 
mercy of the private sector, wealth is concentrated in the hands of elites and inequality has 
deepened.  The   end   of   the   logging   boom   is   imminent,   either   as   sustainable   practices   are 
implemented, which would both decrease log volumes and increase costs, or when all of the 
commercially viable forest is depleted. 
The outlook for long term stability in the Solomon Islands is depressing. Where the private sector 
has invested in the Solomon Islands, it has not created sustainable or equitable growth, instead it has 
aggravated inequality and brought forests to the brink of exhaustion. This is precisely the danger 
with neo-liberal development – the private sector seeks to maximise its own profit and has no 
investment in the long or medium-term stability or security of the majority of people. If the analysis 
presented in this thesis is accurate, there is much cause for pessimism. When the logging industry 
collapses so too will the entire economy. Without an economic base, RAMSI's work, including the 
peace it has presided over, will fail to provide the stability or security that was its reason for 
existence.
73Conclusions
As a case study, RAMSI represents the ideology and agenda of Australian foreign policy in the 
South Pacific, albeit the most interventionist example. Similar patterns of neo-liberal reform are 
evident in Pacific-wide projects such as the Pacific Plan and negotiations for a free trade area. Each 
is contributing to the emergence of regulatory regionalism in the Pacific, however it is during crisis 
situations that Australian foreign policy is able to have the largest impact, as can be seen in specific 
Pacific states, especially Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Naru and most obviously, Solomon Islands. 
Australian foreign policy is not achieving the stated objectives of stability and security but rather is 
facilitating processes of primitive accumulation and establishing an Australian hegemony within the 
region. 
Several questions remain to be answered: how deep and widespread is the transformation in the 
Solomon Islands as a result of RAMSI’s presence? How many of the reforms are directed from 
Canberra, or are of indigenous origin or originate from other actors? How widely held are 
grievances and demands about land rights, recognition of traditional forms of governance, 
inequitable development and devolution of political power in the Solomon Islands today? Are there 
other significant players in society who influence the process, perhaps churches, trade unions and 
political parties? Why and when will the 'private sector' arrive in a meaningful way? And, how long 
will RAMSI stay in the Solomon Islands?
Australian foreign policy makers, including security and aid policy makers, need to take into 
account a broader range of causes of conflict in order to address structural insecurity in the South 
Pacific. This probably entails dropping a rigid adherence to neo-liberalism as a framework for 
security, development and state-building. Instead the focus should be on the needs and desires of 
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grass-roots communities. Creating security and equitable development from the bottom up provides 
strong foundations for regional stability and Australian security. The primary example of failing to 
do this was when a small group of aggrieved fighters who formed the IFM on an island in the South 
Pacific were eventually viewed as a threat to the security of the whole South Pacific region. 
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